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Subject Files - FG006-03A (Chief of Staff, Office Files)

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DOCUMENT NO.	FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
001	Email	Nancy Johnson report - To: Tim Reynolds, et al From: Amy Jensen	1	02/13/2003	P5;
002	Report	The Chief of Staff [page 1]	1	2001	P6/b6;
003	Email	Follow-up - To: Andrew H. Card - From: Ronald I. Christie	1	02/12/2003	P5;
004	Email	[San Diego] - To: Andrew H. Card, et al From: Jim Towey	1	02/13/2003	P5; b7c; b7e; b7f;
005	Letter	Dear Andy - To: Andrew Card	3	03/01/2001	P2; P5; P6/b6;
006	Email	[Friend of Andew Card] - To: Blake Gottesman - From: Travis Thomas	3	03/20/2001	P2; P5; P6/b6;

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Records Management, White House Office of

SERIES:

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554859

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10922

RESTRICTION CODES

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Letter	[Job materials] - To: Andrew Card	3	02/09/2001	P2; P5; P6/b6;
Letter	[Bush-Cheney administration position, with attachment]	2	01/12/2001	P2; P5; P6/b6;
Resume	[Job materials]	10	N.D.	P2; P5; P6/b6;
Letter	[Job materials] - To: POTUS	3	03/16/2001	P2; P5; P6/b6;
Letter	[Job materials] - To: Andrew Card	3	03/03/2001	P2; P5; P6/b6;
Email	New Hampshire - To: Melissa S. Bennett - From: Brett M. Kavanaugh	2	02/19/2003	P5;
Fax Cover Sheet	Fax - To: Andrew Card - From: Jeanne Lu	1	02/14/2003	P6/b6;
	Letter Letter Letter Email	Letter [Bush-Cheney administration position, with attachment] Resume [Job materials] Letter [Job materials] - To: POTUS Letter [Job materials] - To: Andrew Card Email New Hampshire - To: Melissa S. Bennett - From: Brett M. Kavanaugh	Letter [Bush-Cheney administration position, with attachment] 2 Resume [Job materials] 10 Letter [Job materials] - To: POTUS 3 Letter [Job materials] - To: Andrew Card 3 Email New Hampshire - To: Melissa S. Bennett - From: Brett M. Kavanaugh 2	Letter[Bush-Cheney administration position, with attachment]201/12/2001Resume[Job materials]10N.D.Letter[Job materials] - To: POTUS303/16/2001Letter[Job materials] - To: Andrew Card303/03/2001EmailNew Hampshire - To: Melissa S. Bennett - From: Brett M. Kavanaugh202/19/2003

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DOCUMENT NO.	FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
014	Fax Cover Sheet	Fax - To: Andrew Card - From: David Wang	1	02/14/2003	P6/b6;
015	Email	POTUS & FLOTUS - To: Deborah A. Spagnoli, et al From: Tanya T. Turner	1	02/14/2003	P5; P6/b6;
016	Schedule	Schedule of the Chief of Staff [page 2]	1	N.D.	P6/b6;
017	Fax Cover Sheet	Office of the Chief of Staff - To: Andrew Card - From: Melissa Bennett	1	02/14/2003	P6/b6;
018	Email	POTUS table 2/23 - To: Andrew H. Card - From: Ruben S. Barrales	1	02/18/2003	`P5;
019	Letter	United Nations - To: POTUS - From: Harry Doumas	1	02/19/2003	P6/b6;

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020	Letter	Harry Doumas 1	02/19/2003	P6/b6;
021	Email	MSN 1	02/18/2003	P6/b6;
022	Email	British public opinion - To: Daniel J. Bartlett, et al 1 From: Tucker A. Eskew	02/19/2003	P5;
023	Email	Lending - To: Andrew H. Card - From: Joshua B. Bolten 1	02/18/2003	P5;
024	Letter	Dear Mr. President - To: POTUS - From: Noach Dear 1	02/12/2003	P6/b6;
025	Letter	Andy - To: Andrew Card - From: David Chigos 1	02/19/2003	P6/b6;

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Institute of Military Heraldry

554859 F600603A

10747 Cast Fernwood Scottsdale, AZ 85262 U.S.A.

28 January 2003

Mr. Andrew Card White House Chief of Staff The White House 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. Card:

A compendium of U.S. medals, both military and government, is under preparation and I would like to include your Department in order to have a complete representation of U.S. military and civilian decorations.

Accordingly, if you could refer my request to the proper staff member who could provide me with the identification of such medals presented by your Department, as well as the proper citation and description of the award in recognition of loyal personnel. Awards for distinguished, meritorious, superior and outstanding service are a few ways that you can reward your staff. It would be inappropriate, and I would be remiss, if such awards from your Department were not included in my book.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely yours

Donald A Parks, Ph.D.

My

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Telephone: 480-488-2654

Facsimile: 480-488-4264

Kirkpatrick & Lockhart LLP

1800 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Suite 200 Washington, DC 20036-1221 202.778.9000 www.kl.com

January 24, 2003

Mr. Andrew H. Card, Jr.
Chief of Staff to the President
Executive Office of the President
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
First Floor, West Wing
Washington, DC 20036

Dear Andy:

Thank you!

THE CHIEF OF STAFF
HAS SEEN
2/13/03

Sincerely,

George W. Koch

GWK/dsp

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 13, 2003

Dear Mr. Koch:

On behalf of the Chief of Staff, thank you for recommending Larry Brown for a position in the Bush-Cheney Administration.

So that your recommendation can receive full consideration, it is essential that your candidate complete a Presidential Personnel Application. Your candidate can access the application online at www.whitehouse.gov. Completion will ensure consideration in the selection process.

We appreciate your recommendation.

Sincerely,

Clay Johnson
Assistant to the President for
Presidential Personnel and Deputy to the Chief of Staff

Mr. George Koch Kirkpatric & Lockhart, LLP 1800 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Suite 200 Washington, DC 20036-1221



Big Brothers Big Sisters 554859 of America

Judy Vredenburgh

President & CEO jvredenburgh@bbbsa.org

National Office

230 North 13th Street Philadelphia, PA 19107-1538

T 215 567 7000

F 215 665 1770 www.bbbsa.org

THE CHIEF OF STAFF HAS SEEN 2/13/03

Dear President Bush:

Washington, DC 20502

The White House

President George W. Bush

President of the United States

January 31, 2003

Thank you for the genuine and powerful statements you made in the State of the Union Address, urging citizens to volunteer to help our nation's children. Perhaps as important as the \$450 million initiative to bring mentors to those in need was, your confident assertion that "one mentor, one person can change the life of a child... and I urge you to be that person."

We, at Big Brothers Big Sisters, received a 33% increase in volunteer inquiries, through our website in the last few days. This is 32% higher than the previous highest level of response ever. Please know that Americans are responding to your focused call to action, and we are getting great results.

The event yesterday at the Boys & Girls Club in Georgetown was very important in gathering internal and external momentum. Thank you very much for doing the event and highlighting Big Brothers Big Sisters. (I know your schedule is crushing!)

Our organization is motivated nationwide and stands ready and willing to serve the thousands of mentors and children, to make and support the matches that will transform so many, many lives.

God bless you, President Bush. I know I speak for so many, when I say how very appreciative we are of your bold leadership. It is our pleasure to support and follow up. And, where we can, lead.

Sincerely,

Judy Vredenburgh

The Honorable Andrew Card Cc:

Chief of Staff

Judy Vuderley

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE I	RESTRICTION(S)
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Email	Nancy Johnson report - To: Tim Reynolds, et al From: Amy Jensen	1	02/13/2003 I	25 ;

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2018-0011-P

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Records Not Subject to FOIA

554859 F6006-63A

THE WHITE HOUSE 2001 PROJECT THE WHITE HOUSE INTERVIEW PROGRAM REPORT NO. 21

THE CHIEF OF STAFF

CHARLES E. WALCOTT
VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE & STATE UNIVERSITY

SHIRLEY ANNE WARSHAW
GETTYSBURG COLLEGE

STEPHEN J. WAYNE GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY



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Contact Information

The White House 2001 Project Martha Joynt Kumar, Director

Undertaken by presidency scholars and funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts, the White House Interview Program provides information to incoming Presidential staff on White House transitions and operations. See http://whitehouse2001.org for more information. A later version will appear in *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Spring 2001.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	
I. BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE JOB IN BRIEF	2
Roles Roles	2
1. Managerial roles	2
2. Advisory roles	2
Operating Styles and Environments	3
Personal Attributes, Strategies, and Tactics	3
II. Managerial Roles	3
Selecting and Managing White House Personnel	3
Structuring the Staff	6
The White House Office	6
Organization of the Office of the Chief of Staff	<u></u>
General Patterns Division of Labor in Recent Administrations	7
Informal Structures	10
Controlling the Flow of People and Paper	10
Getting Control of the Paper Flow	10
Adjusting and Conforming to the President's Style	12
Guarding the Door to the Oval Office	. 12
Coordinating Presidential Appearances and Statements	13
Managing Information and Brokering Opinions	14
III. Advisory Roles	15
Advising the President on Politics, Policy, and Management	15
Protecting the President's Interests	15
Negotiating with the Environment Congress, the Departments, and Others	17
IV. Personal Styles and Attributes	18
The Variety of Approaches and People	18
"You Are Not the President"	19
V. DEVELOPING A DAILY SCHEDULE	20
Components	20
Daily Routine	21
VI. CONCLUSION	21
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REFERENCES	23
Interviews in White House 2001 Project Other References	23 23
ABOUT THE WHITE HOUSE 2001 PROJECT	1
The White House Interview Program	1
Nomination Forms Online	1
THE WHITE HOUSE 2001 PROJECT REPORT SERIES	3

THE WHITE HOUSE 2001 PROJECT THE WHITE HOUSE INTERVIEW PROGRAM

THE CHIEF OF STAFF

Charles E. Walcott, Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University Stephen J. Wayne, Georgetown University Shirley Anne Warshaw, Gettysburg College

INTRODUCTION

The office of White House Chief of Staff is crucial to the successful operation of the contemporary presidency. As former President Gerald Ford explained:

I started out in effect not having an effective Chief of Staff and it didn't work. So anybody who doesn't have one and tries to run the responsibilities of the White House I think is putting too big a burden on the President himself. You need a filter, a person that you have total confidence in who works so closely with you that in effect his is almost an alter ego. I just can't imagine a President not having an effective Chief of Staff. (Ford)

Ford's second Chief of Staff, Richard Cheney, elaborated on the need for effective White House organization:

Well, it's crucial in terms of how he's going to function as President, whether or not he's effective. His reach, his ability to sort of guide and direct the government, to interact with the cabinet, to deal effectively with the Congress, to manage his relationship with the press, all of those are key ingredients to his success. The White House staff structure and set up and how it functions as an organization determines whether or not he is successful in these relationships. No matter how hard he works or how smart he might be, he can't do it by himself.

The job of the White House Chief of Staff has many common elements from one administration to the next. But there are also key differences, resulting mainly from different Presidents' ideas work styles and beliefs about how the White House should operate. Many former chiefs have stressed that the chief's most important job at the beginning of an administration is simply to find out "what the job is." Mack McLarty, for instance, reported that after talking to most of his predecessors about the job, James A. Baker III told him, "Well, Mack, you just kind of have to be there." (McLarty) In any case, a Chief's understanding of the job has to arise out of close communication between the new President and Chief of Staff, since the President defines the chief's role. But former chiefs likewise stress the value of understanding the basic nature of the job, the possible variations in its performance, and, above all, the pitfalls that any Chief of Staff must avoid. The best way to do this is to talk with those who have held the job before. A typical comment is that of Landon Butler, deputy Chief of Staff in the Carter administration:

I think, by and large, we learned far more from our predecessors than we did from any written material. We learned from our predecessors and they were very helpful. They genuinely wanted us to be successful at running the White House at least. (Butler)

To supplement such conversations, though not to substitute for them, we present here a summary of the wisdom offered by former chiefs in extensive interviews.

I. BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE JOB IN BRIEF

As recently as the beginning of the Carter administration, it was possible to argue that the White House could be run without a Chief of Staff. Those days are past. The complexity of the modern White House requires discipline and coordination that can only be achieved if there is a central coordinating point, someone other than the President to oversee the operation. This job is not easy. Long days, constant crises, and persistent rivalries, much of them built into the institutional structure and processes, the roles of the personnel that occupy the White House, and overlapping missions and interests, create a pressured short time-frame in which to operate. Many chiefs see their job as the second most important and most difficult in Washington. To underline the point, James Baker, who served as Chief of Staff under two Presidents, includes the Chief of Staff office along with Presidential personnel and the counsel as the three jobs that should be filled first, because these people have "got to help the President pick the rest of the administration." (J. Baker, I)

ROLES

Most Chiefs of Staff agree on the critical roles they must perform. These, while interrelated, fall into two broad categories: managerial and advisory.

1. Managerial roles

- > select the key people on the White House staff, and oversee them
- > structure the White House staff system, including the Chief of Staff office
- control the flow of people and paper into the Oval Office, adjusting it to the President's style of doing business
- manage the flow of information and opinion to and from the President and do so in a way that brokers honestly among differing perspectives and recommendations

2. Advisory roles

- > advise the President on issues of politics, policy and management
- > protect the interests of the President
- > negotiate with the environment of the presidency, including Congress, the executive branch, and extra-governmental political groups and individuals

OPERATING STYLES AND ENVIRONMENTS

Although they agree on the roles, they do not agree on a single, "best" way for a Chief of Staff to achieve them. Some of their disagreement stems from the differing people and circumstances involved. The exact nature of the Chief of Staff job will depend upon such things as

- > Presidential styles
- > the circumstances in which they inherited their job, and some from
- > the personnel with whom they had to contend and budget they had to administer
- > partisanship (precedents and advice from earlier administrations)

Variations in the White House environment also naturally affect organizational arrangements, operational procedures, and personnel decisions. Such factors include the shape of the staff, particularly at the time the chief assumes office, coordination with other White House units, and the structure of day-to-day activities that must vary with the President's style, decisional time frame, and to some extent, the administration's priorities. As we will see below, a chief's role is a reflection of the President. The Chief of Staff is always limited by the President's preferences, views, and habits of management and leadership.

PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES, STRATEGIES, AND TACTICS

In addition to role, structure, and processes, the chiefs agreed that certain personal attributes, political strategies, and operational tactics are more likely than others to be successful. <u>Decisiveness</u>, <u>sensitivity</u>, <u>credibility</u>, and <u>political savvy</u> are deemed essential traits for the job.

Strategies based on realistic assumptions about public expectations, those that correctly anticipate elite and public reactions, and those that consider the mood of the country and are designed to work within the broad parameters of public opinion are more apt to achieve the desired goal. Similarly, tactics that incorporate the President's bully pulpit to gain political leverage, that see information as an instrument of power, are also most likely to be successful in today's public-media environment.

Chiefs of staff and their deputies also expressed general agreement on the dangers that may be encountered. Their warnings to future chiefs echoed difficulties that tend to be intrinsic to the job. We will explore these areas of agreement and disagreement in our summary of their advice to the future Chief of Staff.

II. MANAGERIAL ROLES

SELECTING AND MANAGING WHITE HOUSE PERSONNEL

Ultimately, the entire White House staff, with very few if any exceptions, will report to the President through the Chief of Staff. At the outset of an administration, the Chief of Staff should and often has been primarily responsible for putting together the staff in the first place. Having one's own people is essential.

Loyalty, energy, dependability, temperament, and work style are important attributes for working in the White House. At the same time, a chief must ensure that no matter what personal agendas aides may have (and most aides do have them), it is the *President's* agenda they pursue. (Moore) More generally, James Baker advised would-be Chiefs of Staff that:

The people who succeed in Washington are the people who are not afraid to surround themselves with really good, strong people. If you're afraid to surround yourself with really top-notch, quality people – because you're afraid they'll overshadow you or what not, and there is a lot of that that goes on – you're not going to succeed. A strong White House staff buys the President one hell of a lot... (J. Baker, II)

Typical of a Chief given responsibility for selecting his team was John Sununu in the Bush administration, a White House observer related:

When the White House staff was put together, there was very little interaction with the other part of the transition. In other words, it was basically Sununu did his own thing ... anybody that was appointed by the President, that would be an assistant to the President, deputy assistant to the President, special assistant to the President was involved. But to his credit, he gave a very long leash to John Sununu – "If that's the team you want, that's okay. Or, "Are you sure you really want to do it? If you really want to do it it's okay." But the benefit of the doubt went with John Sununu in putting together the White House staff. (background interview)

In order to exercise effective control over White House operations, Chiefs of Staff must be able to pick at least their principal deputies. Prior to the beginning of an administration, the Chief of Staff-designate should oversee the White House transition which should be separate from the rest of the transition to government. Two criteria deemed essential in the initial choice of top staff aides are political savvy and Washington experience. James Baker noted:

It [political credentials] gives you far more cachet in policy debates and inter-departmental policy... If you've been out there fighting the political wars with the President, you're in a better position to speak to those issues than other people who just maybe gave some money... (J. Baker, I)

W. Henson Moore, Samuel Skinner's deputy and a former Member of Congress, remarked that both the Chief of Staff and the deputies... "really ought to have some political experience. This is no place to have on the job training in politics...they've got to have some political instincts." (Moore)

Marlin Fitzwater likewise noted the difference between the management challenges of the White House and those elsewhere, and the importance of both Washington experience and personal relationships:

When you talk about management of the White House from the Chief of Staff, you're really talking about twenty people, a very small group. And that turns out to be a very personal kind of thing. Then there's a second circle of management in which you're kind of directing cabinet officers and deciding agenda issues and matters like that that grow out of it. But in terms of the people management it's a very small group and it's always a personality kind of thing. And that's also why I think businessmen have such a difficult time. There's always this kind of feeling when you bring in businessmen or businesswomen with experience and they'll bring some professionalism to the organization. And they always fail because they always think in line-staff structural relationships and in business they don't have to worry about personal relationships because they have the power. They give orders; they take away your salary; they can fire you; they

can give you bonuses. And in the White House all those normal management techniques go out the window. Oftentimes you can't fire people. (Fitzwater)

A third factor, implicit in the advice that the Chief of Staff pick the top staff, is loyalty. Samuel Skinner noted that

Once a loyalist of a President gets in there... it's the normal tendency of everybody including Presidents and Chiefs of Staff and everybody else to honor that loyalty and, if somebody is trying to push them out, to protect them. So there's a tendency, if loyalists get in to the White House and they... don't have a duty and responsibility to the Chief of Staff as having put them there, the thief of staff can have them go around him very easily unless you have a President who never lets that happen. Even though you control the process, there are ways to get around it.

Naturally a Chief of Staff who comes in the middle of an administration usually does not have the luxury of completely cleaning house, but must be able to have some flexibility in getting the shop in order and his people placed. This was the problem that beset Skinner and to a lessor extent, Leon Panetta when they took over for Sununu and Mack McLarty respectively. In the words of Moore,

The President had his staff. He had been goaded, pushed, convinced into getting rid of Sununu and Card, people... he liked. And he wasn't going to hear of anybody else being replaced on that staff. So once that word gets out to the people who are supposed to be reporting to you and taking orders from you that you can't touch them, you have limited authority to really make things happen. (Moore; see Skinner)

Skinner concurred, noting that "the President also made it quite clear that he did not want a wholesale change in his staff." (Skinner) But, said Skinner,

A good friend of mine, Vernon Jordan, told me... you've got to have your own people in order to make anything work in Washington. I think those people have to be accountable. The only other way you're going to do that is to fire one of the President's favorites and let it be know that you've got to fire him. That's hard to do.

Leon Panetta encountered some of the same difficulty when he attempted to replace press secretary Dee Dee Myers with Michael McCurry at the beginning of his tenure as Chief of Staff. Nonetheless, Panetta managed to bring in a core of key people upon whom he could depend. Both Howard and James Baker likewise insisted on bringing in a solid group of their own people when they took over the Chief of Staff office during the Reagan and Bush administrations. As Howard Baker's deputy, John Tuck recalled:

He picked his own team, as you well know, except for Marlin (Fitzwater) who stayed, who was there before. Everybody else changed over and it was just understood that when Senator Baker became the Chief of Staff that it was going to be a Baker team... (This permitted) a strong Chief of Staff system where the decisions and the decision making process and the people and the access to the President of papers and people was controlled by one person. (Tuck, in H. Baker)

Along the same line, James Baker noted that you don't have to fire people to move them out. When he brought his team aboard the White House in 1992, he chose to "layer" the existing staff, moving the new people to the key jobs. "They probably resented that, and probably rightly so. They weren't fired, but they were layered." (J. Baker, II)

Keeping people too long, however, can be a problem, especially if personalities clash or working styles conflict with one another. Ford's Chiefs Rumsfeld and Cheney faced such a situation in dealing with long-time aide and speechwriter Robert Hartmann, whose dismissal from the White House was out of the question. Their solution to this internal problem was to circumvent Hartmann whenever possible. James Baker likewise advised that "one good way to discipline people when you're in a political environment like that in the government is to cut them out of meetings." (Baker, II) While sometimes effective in the short run, this approach can allow a persistent source of conflict to remain rooted in the White House. It also opens the door to end runs by people who are out of the loop but who still have access to the President. (Fitzwater)

The same kind of problem can appear when a President wants to replace people, but is reluctant to simply let them go. This invites friction and discontent. As Howard Baker put it, "If you cut the dog's tail off, cut it all off at once." (H. Baker)

More commonly, the problem connected to long-term White House service is burnout. A Chief of Staff taking over in mid-term may find, as Alexander Haig did during the Watergate affair and Skinner did after Sununu, that key personnel simply have burned out under the relentless pressure of White House work. (Jones and Skinner) Skinner's advice: "I think just find them another job... You probably ought to refresh on a regular basis." (Skinner)

STRUCTURING THE STAFF

The White House Office

A Chief of Staff can think of structuring in three different senses. The first is structuring the White House Office as a whole. Since most White House staffers report to the President through the Chief of Staff, the Chief of Staff must work with the President to set up an overall reporting and decision making system for the WHO. As many White House veterans have noted, this is best done as soon as possible after the election, so the White House staff will be ready to function immediately after the inauguration, if not sooner.

The experience of recent presidencies indicates that there has been relatively little variation in the overall design of the White House in terms of offices and responsibilities. The basic model for the modern White House dates back to the Nixon administration, and has been modified, but only at the margins since then. Thus, it is likely that the major political offices – Congressional Relations, Public Liaison, Communications and Press, etc., will appear in some form in any new administration, as will the key staff organizations, such as the Office of Management and Administration and the Staff Secretariat. Likewise, the basic model for the NSC and its staff, as well as the domestic policy staff, has become stable. The Clinton White House's employment of the National Economic Council to deal specifically with economic policy has further institutionalized the operation of a White House-based economic group that has functioned in some form since the Ford administration.

Within this overall framework, however, there are have been important differences in operating patterns. Most generally, one can distinguish between relatively "strong" and "weak" Chiefs of Staff. This is, of course, an oversimplification, but it does point to a contrast in organizational strategies. The primary differences are in the degree to which the Chief of Staff controls information flow to the President and

the extent of the Chief of Staff's control over the President's schedule. As previously noted, the contrast between Sununu and Skinner in the Bush administration and between McLarty and Panetta in Clinton's illustrates the strong and weak models of Chief of Staff. From these example it is also clear that the relative "strength" of a Chief of Staff is not just a matter of the Chief of Staff's preference, but is also dependent upon circumstances. The key point, however, is that the Chief of Staff is bound by the President's habits and operating style. The job of the Chief of Staff is to make the best of that, and to compensate where possible for whatever weaknesses emerge.

A further dimension of Chief of Staff "strength" involves the scope of his control of information and access. While all chiefs have sought to oversee the flow of paper and people in the areas of domestic policy and politics, chiefs have varied in their relationship with the National Security Assistant (NSA) and the NSC staff in general. The NSA is one of the principal potential White House competitors of the Chief of Staff. Some Chiefs, such as Leon Panetta (Panetta), have insisted that the NSC go through them, while others have not. This is not always the choice of the Chief of Staff alone. Nonetheless, it can be a fateful choice. In the first four years of the Reagan administration, for instance, the NSA did not report through Chief of Staff James Baker, but through Counselor Edwin Meese. Moreover, once William Clark became NSA, his long-time relationship with the President rendered him outside staff control. (J. Baker II) In hindsight, Baker indicated that he would want his own person in the job of NSA from the start.

Similarly, some chiefs have taken a hands-on approach to the Office of Management and Administration - again, Panetta is an example (Torkelson) - while others have not.

On the whole, the "strong" model tends to be the one lauded by most of those who have served as Chief of Staff or Deputy Chief of Staff. Indeed, Skinner and McLarty are the only recent Chiefs of Staff since Hamilton Jordan under Carter who did not clearly attempt this approach. But the Chiefs caution that this "strength" must be exercised within the understanding that the Chief of Staff is not the President, and that the Chief of Staff serves only the President's agenda.

Organization of the Office of the Chief of Staff

General Patterns

The second structural responsibility of the Chief of Staff is to design his office. As Howard Baker observed, "... a Chief of Staff and a national security adviser... are now so loaded with responsibility and with paper... that they sort of get in the same category as the President does. If they don't have somebody prompting them or watching out for them, they'll get in the same fix." (H. Baker) Again, there has not been a great deal of variation in the organizational schemes for the Chief of Staff office, but there have been different approaches to dividing responsibility.

Most Chief of Staff offices have been relatively lean, with one or two deputies reporting directly to the Chief. Most Democratic administration have had two deputies, with one assigned to handle political chores while the other oversees White House operations. Republican White Houses have sometimes relied on just one deputy, whose job has varied. Michael Deaver, under Reagan, for instance, specialized in communications. Andrew Card, under Bush, specialized in administration.

Reporting came to both of us, both Skinner and me, as to what was going on in Congress. I spent a lot of time talking to congressmen trying to assist the White House in every way. So it was kind

of a loose dividing of reporting authority. I don't recall there ever being anything in writing about all that... (Moore)

In addition to the Chief of Staff and deputy or deputies, there have usually been two or three assistants (variously titled "Personal Assistant," "Executive Assistant," "Staff Assistant," or just "Secretary") to the Chief of Staff and one person at roughly the Staff Assistant level to work under each deputy. By 1998, this number had grown to five.

Beyond that, Chiefs of Staff have varied with regard to the placement of additional people and duties directly within the Office of the Chief of Staff. Donald Regan, for instance, formally had three deputies (holding the rank of deputy assistant to the President), one of whom, Frederick Ryan, supervised the administration's Private Sector Initiative, and with it a substantial staff.

Election season has normally brought substantial campaign responsibilities to the Chief of Staff. This has often been reflected in the addition of people reporting to the Chief of Staff. Jack Watson's office, at the end of the Carter administration, for example, contained several deputies, including a labor liaison and a research director. Leon Panetta's office likewise expanded, providing an organizational home for Counselors and Senior Advisers such as Rahm Emanuel, and George Stephanopoulos, while assuring that they reported to President Clinton through Panetta.

When elections are not impending, a relatively lean Chief of Staff operation is still a viable option. However, the most recent trend is in the other direction. The second four years of the Clinton White House have witnessed a continuation of the practice of placing senior advisers in the Chief's office. Under John Podesta in 1998, for instance, were two Counselors (Paul Begala and Doug Sosnick) and a Senior Adviser (Emanuel) plus two deputy slots, one assistant deputy, the Deputy Director of Millennium Projects, and eight others who assisted these people. Thus the total personnel at the level of staff assistant or above numbered 20. That compares with seven under James Baker in 1992.

Division of Labor in Recent Administrations

A key issue in this organization is how the work is divided among the Chief of Staff and the deputies. There are clearly more demands upon the Chief of Staff Office than one individual can satisfy. Delegation is therefore critical (See Baker II) Patterns have varied depending mainly on the interests and experiences of the Chief of Staff and top staffers. There is no "one best way" to set things up. Depending upon the background and interests of the Chief of Staff and the top aides, the office is frequently involved in congressional relations, communications strategies, and political liaison. For instance, former members of Congress such as Howard Baker, Leon Panetta or Henson Moore, were naturally drawn into this arena. Michael Deaver was deeply involved in communications planning as James Baker's deputy, even before he took over the operation formally.

At the outset of the Reagan administration, James Baker explicitly excluded the Chief of Staff office from policy development, leaving that to Counselor Edwin Meese. Baker assumed responsibility for process. (Deaver) Michael Deaver, who had the title of Assistant Chief of Staff, was responsible for scheduling and travel, the East Wing (the offices of the First Lady and the military) and anything to do with communications. When David Gergen left the White House, Deaver formally took on responsibility for communications. Richard Darman, who replaced Deaver, did not have responsibility for scheduling, which remained with Deaver, but he did oversee management and administration. Another Deputy, James

Cicconi, was primarily responsible for overseeing the decision making process. (Cicconi) When Donald Reagan succeeded Baker, he put three deputies in place, and allowed the Chief of Staff office to expand considerably. But Howard Baker reverted to a simple model, with two top assistants, one of whom specialized in decision process management. (H. Baker and Tuck) When Baker's deputy, Kenneth Duberstein became Chief of Staff, the same model was retained.

Little changed under President Bush's first Chief of Staff, John Sununu. He had one deputy, responsible for overseeing White House operations, and with a varied portfolio beyond that (Card) By the fall of 1991, Sununu had only one top aide, the deputy, Andrew Card, along with the usual complement of lower-level aides. As Card described a key element of his job:

I was kind of the bad guy in the White House. As deputy Chief of Staff I did basically all of the salaries. And I was tough. I would say, "No, we're not going to pay that much... I was also very tough on the number of non-commissioned officers you could have... (Card)

Under Samuel Skinner, the Chief of Staff's staff grew back to a deputy and a counselor (Henson Moore and Cameron Findlay, respectively). Moore dealt mainly with White House mechanics (Moore), with press, scheduling, and speechwriting reporting to him. He also became involved in congressional relations, and the job evolved beyond that:

As it turned out, Sam (Skinner) did not like to travel, so I did all the traveling with the President. . .When you travel with the President you become the Chief of Staff at that point because the staff is supposed to move with the President. (Moore)

When James Baker replaced Skinner at the end of the administration he brought in his own people, but kept the basic model. In fact, his deputy, Bob Zoellick, "actually ran the White House at that time," while Baker functioned mainly as chairman of the Bush re-election campaign. (J. Baker, II)

The Clinton chiefs followed a familiar organizational pattern, with two deputy chiefs (or the equivalent) serving under the Chief of Staff, but Leon Panetta, in the process of strengthening the Chief of Staff role, expanded the Chief of Staff office. Initially, under Mack McLarty, the responsibilities of the deputies were defined rather loosely, as McLarty adjusted to the particular strengths of Mark Gearan and Roy Neel, and to get along without Harold Ickes, whom he had hoped to employ. (McLarty) When Panetta succeeded McLarty, he made Ickes deputy in charge of political affairs and some oversight of substantive issues, while Erskine Bowles took charge of scheduling and management of White House personnel. Panetta also placed senior Presidential advisers George Stephanopoulos and Rahm Emanuel in the Chief of Staff office, assuming that they would report to the President through the Chief of Staff. Moreover, with the 1996 election impending, Panetta placed additional White House staff units speechwriting and communications - in the now-expanded Chief of Staff office. As Chief of Staff, after the election, Bowles in part reverted to the earlier pattern, taking considerable scheduling responsibility himself, while speechwriting and communications were dropped from the Chief of Staff office. However, as noted above, the Chief of Staff office did not shrink back to the simpler model of prior administrations. The senior advisers and others stayed, and the overall staff grew, in part to coordinate the now-expanded office.

Informal Structures

Not all organizational structuring – recurring, predictable activities and responsibilities – is found on organization charts. Successful Chiefs of Staff have supplemented formal arrangements by initiating regular group meetings with key White House personnel. This has been a key management tool for all chiefs so long as the senior staff meetings do not get too large and unwieldy. (Card; H. Baker)

In addition, different chiefs and/or deputies have taken the lead in initiating meetings to plan communications strategy (Deaver), brief the Cabinet, plan the President's schedule (Moore), or organize task forces or "war rooms" for the pursuit of unusually important projects. The extreme case of informal structuring can be found in the small group Al Haig brought together during the waning days of the Nixon administration to handle the routine business of the White House while the President focused on his fight for political survival. (Jones) In any case, the desirability or need for such organizational innovations will most likely be dictated by a President's particular agenda and by circumstances, such as the onset of a campaign season or the development of major legislative efforts like Carter's energy plan or Clinton's health care initiative.

CONTROLLING THE FLOW OF PEOPLE AND PAPER

Getting Control of the Paper Flow

The Chief of Staff must take responsibility for the operation of the White House. To do so, lines of authority must flow to and through his office to the President. No matter how White House functions are organized, the information flow must be up and to the Chief of Staff, usually through the staff secretary, cabinet secretary and deputy Chiefs of Staff. Only by monitoring the full flow of paper to the President can a Chief of Staff assure that all relevant information has been received and all relevant points of view represented.

The fundamental purpose of orderly processes in the White House is to provide the basis for the best-informed decisions possible. The job of the Chief of Staff is to assure that all relevant voices are hear in the decision process, and that choices are made in light of full information. James Baker summarized:

You have to make sure you have an orderly system, that you have a system that's fair. Otherwise, you start the leaking in the press, one against the other. You have to have a system that lets the President hear all sides. And you have to have one, that if you're going to be running the White House, you have to know what's going on. (J. Baker, II)

To assure such fairness, all recent White Houses have employed a decision process whereby decision memoranda are routinely circulated, usually by the staff secretary, to all officials with expertise or a stake in a Presidential decision. The Chief of Staff must monitor the workings of this process closely, for it is here, in the framing of the decision and the description of options, that staffers may be tempted to push their own particular interests, or substitute them for those of their principals. As Howard Baker said of this kind of problem:

Well, that's exactly the level of detail where it occurs, in the staffing of the memo that's going to the President, the decision memo with the options describing - that's where all the fights occur describing what the background is, describing the discussion, describing the options. . . We tried

not to let that spill up to the President but sometimes the memos were so controversial... we just couldn't forge consensus about what this paper would look like. (H. Baker)

Due to the crucial position of the staff secretary in the operation of this system, it is imperative that the Chief of Staff pick a trustworthy staff secretary. Mark Siegel, who served under Carter, noted that Hamilton Jordan, even before he became Chief of Staff, was careful to place his own man, Rick Hutcheson, in that position.

Hamilton is a very smart guy and he understood and we discussed that he (Jordan) would control the paper and control the presidency. He would control the paper in the Oval Office, controlled everything. And why he selected this – Rick, at that point he was a baby.

The Chief of Staff or someone on his staff must supplement the staff secretary in the exercise of judgment as to what gets to the President and what does not. Deputy Chief of Staff Andrew Card, who had this responsibility under Bush, contrasted the staff secretary's monitoring with his own:

They did it watching for policy or consistency of language. I did it to protect the President. Is this something the President has to have today?... the staff secretary job is to be pretty policy wonkish, too. This policy is inconsistent with the one we had the President say last week.... That was more of an editorial role; mine was more of how do I protect the guy in there from wasting his time and energy. (Card)

Leon Panetta made a similar point:

I wanted to funnel all of the issues and decision making that ultimately had to go to the President through the Chief of Staff's operation. That helped a great deal because it came in kind of a vacuum in which staff people and others weren't getting decision on issues unless they had to take it to the President. And there is a lot of decision, frankly, that you could make that don't necessarily have to go to the President..... So my role was to make decisions. If they were important decisions, I would always brief the President. But having those decisions made, whether it's scheduling, whether it's this, whether it's that, keeps that place running. (Panetta)

Beyond decision memoranda, Presidents will also require background papers on issues. President Clinton, for instance, "would want maybe a summary with several pages of backup on a particular matter we were considering." (McLarty) The Chief of Staff is often responsible for the preparation of such materials, and likewise for their thoroughness and balance. At the very least, the Chief of Staff must monitor what goes to the President. If the President's out box contains material that never went through the in box – if, in other words, people are bypassing the staff system, the Chief of Staff must address the problem. Whether by paper or in person, such "end runs" will tend to upset the balance of the decision system.

Of course, the discretion implied in these accounts is liable to abuse, as well as to the perception of abuse. Although H.R. Haldeman denied that he tried to control policy in the Nixon White House, the perception that he did nevertheless was strong. Thus it is important for the Chief of Staff to involve other White House staff in his decision processes (Panetta), and to maintain confidence in the essential accessibility of both the process and the President. Sherman Adams imposed a similar procedural rule during the Eisenhower administration. (Adams)

Adjusting and Conforming to the President's Style

The President must feel comfortable with the people on the White House staff and the way it works. Although "the Chief of Staff's personality dominates the way the White House works, it can only be done if it has the blessing of the President," noted one person who served in that office.

If a President wishes to keep control of a lower level decisional or administrative matter, there is little a Chief of Staff can do. That such an arrangement may be ineffective needs to become obvious to a President before the system can be streamlined. Ford, Carter and Clinton found this out the hard way at the beginning of their administrations.

Landon Butler, who worked in the Carter White House stated: "We were a direct reflection of what the President wanted around him and what he needed. In our case, Carter played a very hands-on role in virtually every aspect of putting the White House together." (Butler) Mack McLarty also set up the type of system that Clinton wanted:

I think the President's style also wanted a large range of opinions, to be coordinated for sure. But he is clearly an engaged person in terms of both his political style, his personality and his policy-making style. So that was kind of the framing of it. I think that's how we approached it. (McLarty)

In explaining this, McLarty also noted that the operation of "the White House and to some extent the administration... was clearly driven by the campaign. And I think to have dramatically altered that would have created a whole other set of dynamics and problems." (McLarty) A senior official familiar with the Clinton operation added:

Mack had a very untenable situation in that regard and did the best he could with that... his authority was constantly and often inadvertently or indirectly undermined by the President's willingness or indulgence... (to allow individuals who had developed a relationship with him on his campaign to see him). (background interview)

Most other recent Presidents have had a very different operating style, which encouraged much more staff control over his schedule, speeches, and visitors. This has been the case for all but Carter and Ford. And, like Clinton, Ford rather quickly abandoned the "spokes-of-the-wheel" system of open access for a more structured system with a strong chief, even though the title "Chief of Staff" was carefully eschewed. He was encouraged to do so by Donald Rumsfeld who accepted the President's offer to oversee White House operations only if he be given the authority of a Chief of Staff. Carter, after trying to do without a Chief of Staff altogether, in the style of his Democratic predecessors, ultimately turned to Hamilton Jordan, then Jack Watson as Chief of Staff, though neither was what one would call a "strong" chief.

Guarding the Door to the Oval Office

A very important aspect of the Chief of Staff role is to guard the flow of people and paper into the Oval Office. Time is an incredibly important Presidential commodity. It is up to the Chief of Staff to help him manage it effectively. "You need to have discipline and order and be discriminating," said James Baker. (J. Baker, I)

Limiting access to the Oval Office serves another purpose. It saves the President from his friends and supporters. Presidents are politicians and as such, like to please. What they don't like to do is say "no."

Thus an important function of the Chief of Staff is to protect the President by eliminating or reducing those politically embarrassing situations which put a President on the spot. Sometimes, of course, obstructing access can be carried too far. Donald Regan overly protected Ronald Reagan. The President's friends had to go public to reach him. On the other hand, when H.R. Haldeman kept people out of the Oval Office, he was following Nixon's wishes. According to one insider, Haldeman "was implementing Nixon's instructions faithfully, maybe harshly but doing it.... He [Nixon] was a recluse...and did not enjoy the give and take of special pleadings and wouldn't do it." (background interview)

Among the Chiefs of Staff there was also a consensus that Presidents need to be protected from what James Baker called "Oh by the way, decisions," i.e. decisions that are made on the spur of the moment without staff consultation or consideration of consequences. "It's not in anyone's interest, "stated Baker, "to get 'oh by the way decisions' as a guy is leaving a meeting." One way to discourage this practice is for Presidents to issue a generic warning at their first cabinet meeting that such practices will be considered out of order and not tolerated. (Baker, I)

Because the job of the staff is to run interference for the President, especially when the discussion turns from the prepared agenda, "the Chief of Staff needs to know what the President is telling people and what they're telling him. You need to have an understanding with him about it." (J. Baker, I) In Reagan's case, he regularly informed his staff if he met with anyone without the staff being present. In Bush's case, unless the meeting was listed as private, an aide from the Chief of Staff office would always be in attendance. (Moore) Being with the President also involves traveling with him. Either the Chief of Staff or a designated deputy should be on all trips away from the White House.

Coordinating Presidential Appearances and Statements

The office of the Chief of Staff must be involved in scheduling the President, which includes long-range (perhaps three months) planning. The Chief of Staff need not personally be deeply involved, however. For instance, in the first Reagan term, James Baker delegated responsibility for scheduling (along with communications and relations with the First Lady and her office) to deputy Michael Deaver. (Deaver). Similarly, Henson Moore, under Samuel Skinner, had responsibility for scheduling, and also had the speechwriters and the press office reporting to him. But whether it is the Chief of Staff or a deputy, all these streams – where the President will be, what the President will say, and how attention will be gained for it – must come together

As gatekeeper, the Chief of Staff must review all Presidential schedules, briefings, and speeches. Leon Panetta noted, "If it was a low-level speech to a particular group, I would just sometimes review it very quickly but let the people involved with the policy have the largest impact." But on high-level speeches, such as State of the Union or other major pronouncements, Panetta paid close attention. (Panetta) Much of the friction between him and Dick Morris, Clinton's political adviser, stemmed from Morris' penchant for changing speeches that had gone through the Chief of Staff clearance process. So strongly did Panetta object to this end-running, that he threatened to quit unless it was stopped. And it was. The Wednesday night meetings in the Mansion were used to bring the principals together to debate and hopefully iron-out their differences. Such special-purpose group meetings, regular or ad hoc, can be used to supplement the normal staff meetings in planning and integrating the President's schedule and message.

MANAGING INFORMATION AND BROKERING OPINIONS

In performing the gatekeeper's role, the Chief of Staff must function as an honest broker. Practically all of the chiefs and their deputies interviewed considered such a role essential. James Baker was advised by a predecessor: "Be an honest broker. Don't use the process to impose your policy views on the President." The President needs to see all sides. He can't be blindsided. (J. Baker II) Additionally, cabinet members need to know that their position will be fairly represented, especially if they encounter difficulty in presenting it themselves. Mack McLarty noted that former Chiefs he talked with had

(A) pretty high degree of consensus about the honest-broker approach, that the Chief of Staff certainly needed to be viewed by cabinet members and others as someone who would not shape information in a way that would unduly affect the President's decision making. The cabinet officers and others had the right to expect their information to be fairly presented. (McLarty)

Honest brokerage does not mean having no opinions, or refusing to offer them when asked by the President. It does, however, mean assuring that the decision process will include all relevant points of view, without allowing the agenda or views of the Chief of Staff to bias or distort that process. (Jones) Nor is it enough to be in fact an honest broker. The Chief of Staff must be perceived as such by those seeking access, in person or for their ideas, to the President.

Although chiefs disagreed on how tight personal access to the President should be, there was unanimity that it should be administered fairly with sensitivity to the position of those who wished to gain an audience. As James Baker put it, "You walk around with a target on your chest and on your back. You use up your chits pretty quickly because the job of the Chief of Staff is to say 'no' to people. Everybody wants something from the President, and your job is to say no or say yes, maybe, but." (J. Baker, I)

Being a good listener is another attribute of the honest brokering function. According to Howard Baker, "There wasn't a day went by when in a senior staff meeting somebody didn't point out to me something that I didn't know about and was not sensitive to. It was an early warning system that worked very well." (H. Baker)

Perhaps the key element in the role of the broker is the process of soliciting opinions prior to Presidential decisions – a process that also can work in the direction of consensus building. While the primary responsibility for doing this, usually via formal memoranda, falls to the Staff Secretary, it is a process the Chief of Staff must monitor. It is the main point at which people will attempt to get access to the decision process – even to the point of staffers substituting their views for, e.g., a cabinet member's. As Howard Baker's deputy, John Tuck, said:

Well, that's exactly the level of detail where it occurs, in the staffing of the memo that's going to the President, the decision memo with the options describing the discussion, describing the options. And all the fights occur on just exactly that level of detail. We tried not to let that spill up to the President but sometimes the memos were so controversial – and I can only think of one or two where the memo was bigger than it should have been because we just couldn't forge a consensus about what this paper would look like. (Tuck, in H. Baker)

As a broker, the Chief of Staff is also responsible for Presidential briefings. The regular morning meetings between the President and Chief of Staff are a time for briefings. But for more formal briefings,

involving multiple participants, the Chief normally works with other staffers. Panetta described such a process:

Just to give you an example, clearly national security issues where there were decisions related to what was going to happen in Bosnia... (etc.) would go to the President. What I would do is work with the National Security Adviser and basically set up the briefing so they could make their presentation to the President. And, because of the nature of this President usually even on scheduling issues, you'd go in with a schedule. You'd present a proposed schedule to the President but you would let him obviously comment on that as well. (Panetta)

III. ADVISORY ROLES

ADVISING THE PRESIDENT ON POLITICS, POLICY, AND MANAGEMENT

Although the Chief of Staff is first and foremost an honest broker, it is unlikely that a staffer so close to a President would not be called upon as an adviser, as well. This is particularly true in areas of the Chief's special interest or competence. Leon Panetta, for example, as a former OMB director, was an adviser on budgetary matters. (Panetta). Mack McLarty, with a background in private business, advised President Clinton on his economic planning. (McLarty)

One important aspect of advising is integrating policy and politics. Most other advisers, inside and outside the White House, specialize in one or the other. But the Chief of Staff is expected to be conversant with both. James Baker gave an example of this in discussing the advice President Bush received concerning the economy in 1992:

I want to tell you the problem there was not so much that President Bush wasn't listening to (his advisers)... But he was listening to his economic advisers, who were giving him good economic advice – good economic advice – but lousy political advice. This, I think, was the fault of the White House staff and organization at the time. They should have been able to see that, while the economy might not have needed any action... we nevertheless needed an economic or domestic policy agenda around which to coalesce a campaign. (J. Baker II)

More generally, Baker described the Office of the Chief of Staff as "the place where policy and politics come together." (J. Baker, I)

PROTECTING THE PRESIDENT'S INTERESTS

The role of the Chief of Staff as adviser to the President is inherently problematic, however, since as it has the potential to conflict with the role of honest broker. Nevertheless, the Chief of Staff is often required to advise, especially when that consists of carrying bad news or disagreement to the President. Others may want to, but often find that they cannot. This falls under the category of protecting the interests of the President. Donald Rumsfeld spoke to this issue:

Second, you've got to have a person who can tell you what they think... and it's rare when you're President. Most people come up to me as Chief of Staff and say I'm going in and tell him it's the dumbest thing I've ever seen and he's simply got to change it. They get in there, slobber all over him, kiss his ring, tell him how wonderful he is, leave and walk out and say, gee, I really told him. I'd say that's the most groveling, sycophantic behavior I've ever seen in my life. And they say, no, I told him... People just simply do not walk in, point their finger at the President and say, look: that's wrong. (Rumsfeld)

Henson Moore explained:

It's just something about the Oval Office, there's something about the aura of the power of a President that people just won't say what really needs to be said to a President except a very choice few people who are so close to him and were so close to him before he was President that they can overcome it, or they have such a position of trust and respect held for them by the President that they don't feel intimidated." (Moore)

"Sam Skinner and I were not that close to the President. We were staff and he listened to us politely, but if his initial instinct was different from mine or Sam's, he'd go with his initial instinct. We didn't have the ability to turn him from that." (Moore) A factor that aggravated this problem in the Bush White House was the President's decision to keep White House operations separate from the campaign. The effectively kept Skinner, the Chief of Staff, out of the political loop and greatly limited his overall influence, even with elements of his own staff. (Skinner),

The protection of the President's interests is perhaps most crucial in times of crisis. The Iran-Contra affair in the Reagan administration illustrated what can happen when the advisory system fails to work well. James Baker made that clear:

When (President Reagan) got in trouble was when that system broke down after I left and after Mike Deaver left, particularly. They got him to agree to some things on Iran-Contra and other things that were a mistake. Bill Casey always wanted to go in there and see the President by himself. But as long as the President would tell us, then we could act to either say, "Wait a minute. Do you really want to do this or do you not?" (J. Baker I; see also Deaver)

Mack McLarty also faced a crisis when the Whitewater accusations began to fly. Here, protection of the President's interests had more to do with coping with forces beyond the presidency. He described his approach:

The way you deal with that I think as effectively as you can, and I think we were reasonably good at it, is to really try to segment it and separate is as much as you possibly can and isolate it. You've got to deal with it, but we did set up a task force to deal with it. Therefore, you've got people who are concentrating on this, capable, skilled, dealing with the issues and then that allows, obviously, the agenda to go forward... (McLarty)

Presidents may even need to be protected from themselves. H.R. Haldeman, President Nixon's Chief of Staff, wrote:

I soon realized that this President had to be protected from himself. Time and again I would receive petty vindictive orders... after a Senator made an anti-Vietnam War speech: "Put a 24-hour surveillance on that bastard." And so on and on and on. If I took no action, I would pay for it. The President never let up. He'd be on the intercom buzzing me ten minutes after such an order... I'd say "I'm working on it," and delay and delay until Nixon would one day comment, with a sort of

half-smile on his face, "I guess you never took action on that, did you?" "No." "Well, I guess it was the best thing . . ." (Haldeman)

NEGOTIATING WITH THE ENVIRONMENT CONGRESS, THE DEPARTMENTS, AND OTHERS

Chiefs of staff need to get around. They cannot remain closeted in the White House. However, one of the areas of difference among the various Chief of Staff was how much visibility they should personally have. Howard Baker, James Baker, Dick Cheney, and Ken Duberstein all urged the Chief of Staff to stay in the background and not become the center of attention. James Baker saw it as a function of the Chief of Staff to keep the press informed of developments, but to do so on a background basis. "That's not leaking, that's spinning," he said. (Baker, I) Increasingly, however, chiefs have functioned as spokespersons, negotiators, and occasionally, as go-betweens on key issues. Sununu linked the Bush White House to conservative groups, James Baker to the Republican political establishment in 1992, while McLarty developed and maintained the Clinton administration's contacts with the business community.

A key element of the role of most recent Chiefs of Staff has been congressional relations. Though the White House has an office that specializes in this, the Chief of Staff has nonetheless become a major administration spokesman, at least since the emergence of James Baker in that role in the early Reagan years. Prior to that, even a former member of Congress like Donald Rumsfeld did relatively little in that area. (Rumsfeld)

A more common view among more recent chiefs was that of Howard Baker:

I think it's enormously important though for a President to have a good understanding of the Congress and what's going on up thee and even perhaps a good relationship. A Chief of Staff from that setting can help almost always. Leon Panetta helped and I think I helped. (H. Baker)

John Tuck went so far as to say that Baker "became in fact the congressional affairs guy as well as the Chief of Staff" because members trusted him and "knew what he said would be the policy of the administration." (Tuck, in H. Baker) While that will not often be the case, Andrew Card nonetheless estimated that congressional relations is "probably a good 30 per cent of the responsibility" of the Chief of Staff. (Card)

Another "external" aspect of the Chief of Staff job is dealing with the press. The Chief of Staff may be asked to play a public role as spokesperson for the administration on Sunday talk shows and the like. Beyond that, there is much room for a quieter role. As James Baker pointed out:

You have to be willing to background the press. Background, not leak. There's a big difference. But one of the things Cheney told me before I took the job, he said, "Be sure you spend a lot of time with the press giving them your spin, why you're doing these things. Talk to them. But always do it invisibly. (J. Baker, II)

James Baker argued that the "on the record" public presence, attempted by Donald Regan, worked less well because "nobody wanted to hear it from the Chief of Staff. He wasn't elected. They wanted to hear it from the President." (J. Baker, II)

Leon Panetta met regularly with the press for formal and informal briefings.

You met with the press in the Roosevelt Room to brief them on issues. For example, if we were putting out a budget or putting out a major issue... and you wanted to make sure that the press would give it the kind of emphasis that we wanted, you would do briefings... Then sometimes I would do a one-on-one briefing with a reporter in the Chief of Staff's office. And it varied depending on what the issue was. I didn't do that for everything. (Panetta)

The Chief of Staff also may become involved in cabinet relations, though this is likely to be a smaller part of the job. The White House normally has a cabinet secretary to handle most of the load. Indeed, a veteran of the office noted that "there is natural tension between the Chief of Staff and a cabinet." Presidents have varied in whether they have given the Chief of Staff cabinet rank. The same official's take on that was "I don't know that it makes any difference."

Finally, the Chief of Staff must deal in some ways with interest groups, at least to the extent of scheduling the President for fundraisers. In turn, according to Panetta, the White House must be sensitive to donors:

These are the kind of big players who are always around.... They are constantly the people you turn to because they have the money for these events. I think, as a result of that, there is without question a greater sensitivity to the issues that they are involved with... .Now, does it control policy, which is the major question in the minds of the American people? Does it control policy? Not necessarily but it sure as hell has an impact as far as decision that are made. It is a factor and it is a growing factor. (Panetta)

Panetta reported that he did feel obligated to meet with and listen to such people. (Panetta)

IV. Personal Styles and Attributes

THE VARIETY OF APPROACHES AND PEOPLE

Both Presidents and Chiefs of Staff come from a variety of backgrounds, display a diversity of personal strengths, weaknesses, and operating styles, and encounter widely differing circumstances during their time in the White House.

Much of the advice relevant to this mix of factors is embedded in what has gone before. Certainly the key is for the Chief of Staff to adapt to the style of the President. The hands-on approach of Jimmy Carter or Bill Clinton certainly required a different form of staff support than the hands-off approach of Ronald Reagan. (Butler; McLarty; Baker I). Likewise, the temperament of the chief executive requires adjustments. The essential factor, perhaps, is achieving the trust of the President. Leon Panetta stated that:

The first and foremost quality that is essential is trust. You've got to have their trust. To some extent, you have to build that trust because you're just going in to a job, you have to prove yourself. But, ultimately, if you have that trust and you develop that trust, you can do the job. (Panetta)

One also needs to adapt to the various other prominent actors in the White House. Mack McLarty stressed the importance of the Vice President:

Another concept I felt strongly about that was not necessarily echoed from the other Chiefs of Staff (with whom he spoke) was that the Vice President be integrated into the Office of the President. Clinton and Gore clearly ran as a team; the Vice President was someone of real standing, a strong personality. And the President's wishes were to have Vice President Gore as an integral part of the team... to keep the Vice President in the information flow and in important meetings... and also have certain areas where he or she would have direct responsibility... (McLarty)

Leon Panetta elaborated upon the importance of the First Lady:

I think, if there's anything that is probably as common a trend in the White House as Presidents who don't want to offend people, it's that they have very tough first ladies who have been through a lot of the battles and just by the nature of what they've gone through are very strong individuals. (Panetta)

Panetta developed a weekly briefing session for Hillary Clinton for the first six or eight months of his tenure as Chief of Staff. After that, the necessary trust having been established, the meetings "kind of faded away." (Panetta). Similarly, in the Reagan White House, part of Michael Deaver's value as deputy Chief of Staff lay in the confidence that Nancy Reagan placed in him. (Deaver) When Deaver left, Donald Regan was unable to establish such a relationship, which helped lead to his downfall.

Chiefs of staff have come from very different backgrounds. Washington savvy, as noted above, is a desirable trait regardless of background. But there was at least a suggestion that people who have been top decision-makers have a harder time adjusting to the staff role than others do, as both Governor Sununu and Treasury secretary (and former Merrill Lynch CEO) Regan discovered. A former official noted, "I think the most difficult thing for a governor to make the change to becoming a Chief of Staff is that a governor is a principal and a Chief of Staff is staff. You must realize that the spotlight is not supposed to be shining on me; it is supposed to be shining on the other guy." (background interview) Marlin Fitzwater, who served under Reagan and Bush, uttered a similar refrain: "In the end every Chief of Staff is a servant of the President, and the more independence they ask for or try to carve out for themselves, the more likely they are to fail." (Fitzwater)

Regardless of background; one final piece of people-oriented advice from James Baker, reiterating advice noted above, would seem to apply to all who would be Chief of Staff:

One very important rule in Washington generally is to surround yourself with the best people you can get. People who are so insecure that they are not willing to put really good people in as their deputies don't succeed. If they're worried so much about their *own* visibility or public persona that they're not going to put somebody strong in, then they're going to fail. (J. Baker, I)

"YOU ARE NOT THE PRESIDENT"

James Baker, Ken Duberstein, and others reiterate the importance of the chief never forgetting the staff component of his title. Remember you are staff, not elected or appointed by President and confirmed by the Senate. "The Chief of Staff has the second most powerful job in government but it's staff. The minute you forget that you're in trouble." (Baker, I) In another interview, Baker repeated much the same warning, "You're really powerful but every bit of that power is derivative from the President. The minute you forget that you get in trouble. And it would be totally inappropriate to call a committee chairman and say, 'Come down to my office to negotiate.' Sometimes they might want to. If one of them wanted

to come down, that's fine. You do that. But generally speaking, I went up there and I spent a lot of time up there." (J. Baker, II)

Duberstein made the point with a story of a "crusty Democratic congressman" who once said to him,

"Duberstein, you're smarter than 95 per cent of the SOB's up here. You know it and we know it. But what you have to remember is we're elected and you ain't." One of the best pieces of advice I ever got. (Duberstein)

Not only must Chief of Staff keep their own egos in check, but they must be sensitive to the egos and interests of others who work in the White House. Long hours, constant pressures, and personal ambitions, can produce dysfunctional behavior that undercuts a team effort. According to Henson Moore, a former member of Congress and deputy chief in the Bush administration:

The hours are very long. The pressure is very great for the President, to have him be successful. The warfare and backstabbing is more acute there than I ever saw in the department or ever saw in the Congress. If something goes wrong, you don't want to be blamed for it; you want to put the blame on somebody else. You want to have an exit strategy that you leave as a hero not as a dog." (Moore)

McLarty's deputy, Roy Neel, offered a similar warning:

The White House... nurtures junkies who grow to feel like they have to have this rush of the daily pressures and the high stakes stuff. That can be good for a while but it does burn people out. Someone has to be there to evaluate when someone has burned out. You can't leave it to the individuals to decide when they've lost their effectiveness." (Neel)

V. DEVELOPING A DAILY SCHEDULE

COMPONENTS

The daily schedule of the Chief of Staff can best be seen as having four components. The first and primary component is to ensure that the President's daily schedule accomplishes what the President needs at that point in time. Every meeting the President has is discussed with the Chief of Staff before it is put on the schedule. The Chief of Staff reviews the President's daily schedule with his staff to assure any changes or modifications are needed.

And as noted previously, when the schedule calls for Presidential travel, as it often will, either the Chief of Staff or a member of the chief's staff will almost always be a part of the traveling party, performing the kind of coordination on the road that the Chief of Staff must provide in the White House itself. (Skinner) The second component of the daily schedule of the Chief of Staff is to ensure that every speech the President makes or position the White House takes is consistent with broad Presidential themes. Every policy that moves through the White House has to be cleared by the Chief of Staff. The third component of the daily schedule is representing the President in meetings with members of Congress, the departments, or constituent groups. The Chief of Staff has the authority to negotiate on behalf of the President within certain boundaries. In summary, the Chief of Staff is the trainmaster of the White House. He has to make sure the trains run on time, (Card) but the Chief of Staff also needs to make



sure they don't collide. If the Chief of Staff does not personally oversee all of this activity, a designated deputy must be given both the responsibility and the authority.

DAILY ROUTINE

There is a clear rhythm in all administrations. The morning meetings of the Chief of Staff begin with a small group of top staff within the chief's office and then move to a larger meeting that includes all senior staff, and finally to a private meeting between the chief and the President - all by 9:00 am. The chief may also attend the President's national security briefing which also occurs in the early morning. In the occasional instance where this pattern has not been faithfully followed, problems have arisen. Samuel Skinner, for instance, notes that this was not always the case during his term as Chief of Staff, but advises that it ought to be. (Skinner)

The White House day generally begins at 7:00am with a meeting which includes the deputy Chiefs of Staff, and perhaps the press secretary and congressional liaison. In the Bush administration, OMB director Richard Darman often attended. Overnight issues such as national emergencies, economic reports, or intelligence materials (Brady) are addressed here. The 7:00am discussion provides a framework for the larger meeting of senior staff at 7:30 or 8:00am. The senior staff meeting includes top White House aides, most of whom carry the designation "Assistant to the President". This group, which tends to be 10-15 in number, is overseen by the Chief of Staff. There is a sense throughout the various administrations that only senior staff should attend, not their designees. The senior staff meetings usually begin with a discussion of the schedule of the President's day (Brady).

After the senior staff meet, the Chief of Staff meets alone with the President (usually at 8:30 or 9:00), depending on the President's personal schedule. At this meeting the President is briefed on his schedule for the day, issues in Congress, and other matters that emerged in the senior staff meeting earlier.

Some variations on the daily schedule of the Chief of Staff involve the re-election process when the Chief of Staff might meet in the evenings with campaign staff, budget negotiations and other dealings with members of Congress, and national crises.

VI. CONCLUSION

The tasks of the Chief of Staff are many, varied, subtle and critically important to the success of a presidency. While there can be no simple prescription for doing the job right, certain principles do emerge from the experiences of those who have held the position. Very briefly summarized, they are:

Gain control.

The White House is large and complex, and its responses to events must often be immediate. This is not an environment conducive to lengthy discussion or loose management. Successful chiefs have been "strong" ones, but not self-interested or autocratic.

Adapt to the stylistic preferences and needs of the President.

Just as Presidents differ, optimal approaches to working with them will also. Nothing is more important to remember than that the power of the Chief of Staff derives only from the President. A chief who forgets this precept, who acts as if he were President, will get into trouble sooner or later.

Protect the President.

Adjusting to the Presidential style does not preclude compensating for Presidential weaknesses. H.R. Haldeman's well-known tales of the Presidential orders he did not carry out serve as a lesson and a warning for any Chief of Staff. (Jones) Above all, help the President avoid making what James Baker calls "oh, by the way" decisions, where commitments are made without sufficient staffing or thoughtful consideration. (J. Baker, I)

Choose bright, trustworthy and loyal subordinates.

Be willing to delegate work to them in the certainty that it will get done as it should.

Be an honest broker.

Arguably, this is the most important point of all.

Run a lean shop, be flexible, and establish a rhythm.

Under most circumstances, keep the Chief of Staff office itself relatively lean, to keep the management challenges of that office reasonable. Be sensitive for the need of informal, fluid, often temporary organizational devices (regular meetings, war rooms, etc.) to cope with particular problems and opportunities. In addition to establishing clear rhythms for normal presidential and White House days, be careful to include in discussions and decisions only those with a need and competence to be there. But be careful at the same time not to create groups that are too unwieldy to accomplish their work.

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January 29, 2003

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Michael J. Stanton 1401 H Street, NW • Suite 900 Washington, DC 20005

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Michael J. Stanton 1401 H Street, NW • Suite 900 Washington, DC 20005

ABOUT THE WHITE HOUSE 2001 PROJECT

http://whitehouse2001.org

Presidency scholars lead a two-part project designed to provide incoming White House staff members with information on operating key White House offices and to help Presidential nominees fill out the tidal wave of forms they face in the appointments process. Funded by The Pew Charitable Trusts, a foundation known for the stature of its programs and the nonpartisan nature of its organization, the White House 2001 Project works with two broad, Pew initiatives: The Transition to Governing Project of the American Enterprise Institute and the Presidential Appointee Initiative of the Brookings Institution. White House 2001 was designed and developed by the board and members of the Presidency Research Group, the worldwide professional organization of scholars focused on the American presidency and a section of the American Political Science Association.

THE WHITE HOUSE INTERVIEW PROGRAM

Unlike corporations both large and small, a White House begins without a record compiled by its previous occupants. The goal of the White House Interview Program is to smooth the path to power by furnishing incoming staff with substantive information about the operation of seven White House offices critical to an effective beginning: Chief of Staff, Staff Secretary, Press Office, Office of Communications, Office of the Counsel to the President, Office of Management and Administration, and the Office of Presidential Personnel. Through interviews with current and former White House staff members from the last six administrations, the White House Interview Program provides new staff with detailed information about how their White House offices function, the organization of their units, and the roles played by the heads of each office.

In addition to this institutional memory, the White House Interview Program provides a support package of important tools previous staff have identified as invaluable. These tools include a "rolodex" of contact information about the people who previously served in their posts with current addresses and phone numbers. The White House Interview Program also provides the first ever detailed organization charts of White House offices approximately every six months through the Carter administration. The scholars associated with the project, researching and writing about the White House staff, are nationally recognized for their work on the presidency. They are: Professors Peri Arnold, MaryAnne Borrelli, John Burke, George Edwards, Karen Hult, Nancy Kassop, John Kessel, Martha Joynt Kumar, Bradley Patterson, James Pfiffner, Terry Sullivan, Kathryn Dunn Tenpas, Charles Walcott, Shirley Anne Warshaw, and Stephen Wayne.

NOMINATION FORMS ONLINE

In order to address the volume of information required from appointees and the problem of the plethora of forms to be filled out by nominees, the *Nomination Forms Online* program provides a software package that nominees can use to complete the myriad of forms required by the White House, the FBI, the US Office of Government Ethics, and, where appropriate, the Senate committee of jurisdiction. The software uses innovative programming techniques so that the software distributes repetitive information across the several forms nominees must complete. The software allows the nominee to store information

The Chief of Staff

for future use in completing annual reports. It also makes available a portable file of data in standard formats so the nominee can share information, at his or her discretion, with the White House Office of Presidential Personnel and other agencies. Nomination Forms Online is freeware.

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February 13, 2003

ROBERT L. EHALICH, JR

STATE HOUSE ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND 21401 (TOLL FREE) 1-800-811-8338

TTY USERS CALL VIA MD RELAY

The Honorable Tom Ridge Secretary U.S. Department of Homeland Security Washington, D.C. 20528

Dear Secretary Bege,

First of all, I want to thank you for all that you are doing to direct our nation's homeland security efforts. It is easy to see why President Bush has entrusted you with this critical task. Please do not hesitate to contact us if there is anything we can do in the State of Maryland to assist you in your efforts.

As you continue the build out of your Department, I hope you will consider locations in the State of Maryland for future needs. There are tremendous sites now available, close-in office buildings ready for immediate occupancy, and a highly trained workforce that could be deployed on very short notice. I am confident that Maryland can meet the needs of the Department of Homeland Security.

We have a dynamic new Secretary at Maryland's Department of Business and Economic Development (DBED) eager to work with your staff to locate additional space needs your agency may require. Mr. Aris Melissaratos, our DBED Secretary, can be reached at 410.767.6301. He is ready to work with your staff to assist you in any way.

Thank you again for agreeing to spearhead America's homeland security campaign. Please do not hesitate to contact me at any time to discuss how the State of Maryland can join you in those efforts.

Sincerely.

Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr.

Governor

cc: Andrew Card John Murray

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A Fax From Governor Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr.

GOVERNOR EHRLICH

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BRIG. GEN. ALLAN RALPH ZENOWITZ

2555 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20037

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as regards, Senator Snowe's letter, without newigan FTE or political plot. I could be asserted as a coreer SES, via a transfer.

with kind personal regards.

Sucrely 1

Such 2

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE

COUNSEL TO THE ASSISTANT
MAJORITY LEADER
250 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING

250 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING (202) 224-5344

E-Mail: Olympia@snowe.senate.gov Web Site: www.senate.gov/~snowe

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-1903

January 23, 2001

COMMITTEES:

ARMED SERVICES
CHAIR,
SEAPOWER SUBCOMMITTEE

BUDGET

COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION CHAIR, OCEANS AND FISHERIES SUBCOMMITTEE SMALL BUSINESS

Andrew Card Chief of Staff The White House 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, D.C. 20270

Dear Andy:

Lhave enclosed a resume I recently received from Allan R. Zenowitz, of Washington, D.C.

Mr. Zenowitz recently contacted me to express his interest in serving in the Bush Administration, and asked that I forward his resume for your consideration. He specifically noted his interest in serving at FEMA, DoD, State Department, or the National Security Council, where his experience may be of service.

I trust that you will give him every consideration as decisions are made in the weeks to come. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me or Kevin Raye, my Chief of Staff, at 202-224-5344.

With best regards,

/ XIII

Sincerely.

OLYMPIA J SNOWE

United states Senator, Maine

Enclosure

Allan Ralph Zenowitz

Allan Ralph Zenowitz is an Executive Officer with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which he joined in 1979 (at its inception), as the Director of the Resource Management Division; with further assignments as Chief of the Federal Plans Division, Chief of the National Defense Executive Reserve Division, and as a Senior Policy Coordinator Officer with the FEMA Training and Fire Programs Directorate. All positions have involved government-wide coordination.

Mr. Zenowitz entered Federal service 1971, with the Department of Defense, where he was assigned as the Regional Director of the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency with Emergency coordinating responsibilities in New England, New York, New Jersey, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. He has served as Special Assistant for Hazardous Material Management, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and assigned to the Pentagon. Prior to that, Mr. Zenowitz served with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts government, starting in 1965, as the Director, Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency and Office of Emergency Preparedness. Other assignments included service as Chairman, Massachusetts Emergency Communications Commission, Federal-State Coordinator for the Governor's Office, Public Safety Advisor to the Governor, Assistant to the Governor, and membership on the Massachusetts Radiological Advisory Commission.

He has served, as President, National Emergency Management Association, is a trustee of the Christian Herter Chair in International Relations and for many years, served as the Judge of the annual Harvard Yale Debate.

In the private sector, Mr. Zenowitz was a partner in a management consulting firm specializing in business reorganization and development. He served as an Armored Reconnaissance Unit Commander in the U.S. Army, and held General Staff assignments as a mobilization designee in intelligence and logistics. His military education includes attendance at the U.S. Army Armor School, U.S. Army Logistics Management College, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, U.S. Naval War College and National Defense University.

He has been awarded the Legion of Merit, Meritorious Service Medal, Army Commendation Medal, a White House citation for Outstanding Public Service, and the Department of Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Award.

Mr. Zenowitz was educated at Trinity College, the University of Connecticut, the University of the State of New York, and the New England School of Law. He holds degrees in government, public policy, and a juris doctorate. He has attended professional courses at Harvard University's Kennedy School of government and the School of Public Health.

He recently served at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), as a Task Force member – Homeland Defense Committees – Combating Chemical, Biological,

Allan Ralph Zenowitz (continued)

Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism and Cyber Threats and Information Security.

Previously, he served as a National Security Council Task Force member - Emergency Preparedness - Crisis Management.





FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE				PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
1. 1							
Email	[San Diego] - To:	Andrew H. Card,	et al From	: Jim Towey	1	02/13/2003	P5; b7c; b7e;
							b7f;

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COLLECTION:

Records Management, White House Office of

SERIES:

Subject Files - FG006-03A (Chief of Staff, Office Files)

FOLDER TITLE:

554859

FRC ID:

10922

OA Num.:

11094

NARA Num.:

11094

FOIA IDs and Segments:

2018-0011-P

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Records Not Subject to FOIA

FOR	M SUBJECT/TI	ITLE			PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTIO	N(S)
				()				<u> </u>
Lette	Dear Andy	- To: Andrew Card	i da		3	03/01/2001	P2; P5; P6/b	6;

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE			PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Email	[Friend of Andew (Card] - To: Blake Gott	esman - From: Tra	vis Thomas 3	03/20/2001	P2; P5; P6/b6;

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE		PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Letter	[Job materials] - T	o: Andrew Card	3	02/09/2001	P2; P5; P6/b6;

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Records Not Subject to FOIA

554959 F600603A



March 15, 2001

Mr. Andrew Card Chief of Staff The White House

Dear Mr. Card,

Thank you again for taking the time to interview with us for our American Profile series. Enclosed is a copy of the interview for your records.

As per my previous letter, we hope to schedule an interview with President Bush in the near future. Thanks again for your consideration. We look forward to working with you.

Sincerely,

Steve Scully Political Editor

FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
A				
Letter	[Bush-Cheney administration position, with attachment]	2	01/12/2001	P2; P5; P6/b6;
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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE		PÁGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
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Resume	[Job materials]		10	N.D.	P2; P5; P6/b6;

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Letter	[Job materials] - 7	Γο: POTUS		3	03/16/2001	P2; P5; P6/b6;	• •

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Records Not Subject to FOIA

554859 F600603A

Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives T lephone List

The White House

Washington, D.C. 20502

whitehouse.gov/news

Main Phone: 202-456-6708 Fax: 202-456-'019

NAME	EXTEN	ON#	ROOM#
Carlson-Thies, Stanley Associate Director for Law and Policy	X 6-0379		115B
Click, Carrie Staff Assistant to Don Eberly and Don Willett	X 6-0340		113
Dilulio, John (X 6-6754 Private Line-DO NOT DISTRIBUTE) Assistant to the President & Director of the Office of Faith- Based & Community Initiatives	X 6-6756		115A
Dilulio, John – Guest Phone	X6-6590		115
Eberly, Don Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy Director of the Office of Faith-Based & Community Initiatives	X 6-0341 X 6-6757		113
Eberly, Don – Guest Phone Ryun, Catharine Office Administrator	X 6-5675		115
Scott, Reverend Mark Associate Director for Community Outreach	X 6-6728	,	115 B
Tennery, Michele Associate Director for Public Affairs	X 6-6701		115B
Trevino Cummins, Lisa Associate Director for Special Projects	X 6-6713		115B
Willett, Don Special Assistant to the President and Director of Law and Policy	X 6-0338		113
Willett, Don – Guest Phone	X 6-0339		113

National Association of Counties

January 30, 2001

Mr. Blake Gottesman The White House 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, D.C. 20500 (202) 456-1907

Hier 12/01. I am writing to request 8 x 10 color or black and white photographs of several senior White House officials. The National Association of Counties (NACo) would like to write a featured story on these individuals in our national publication, County News and urgently need these photos. Specifically, we need photographs of Andrew Card, Chief of Staff; Clay Johnson, Personnel Chief; Karl Rove, Senior Advisor & Assistant to the President; Ari Fleisher, Press Secretary; Karen Hughes, Counselor, Joshua Bolten, Deputy Chief of Staff; Nicholas Calio, Legislative Chief, Mitch Daniels, Director of OMB; and John Dilulio.

NACo was created in 1935 when county officials wanted to have a strong voice in the nation's capital. More than six decades later, NACo continues to ensure that the nation's 3066 counties are heard and understood in the White House, the halls of Congress and throughout the United States. NACo's membership totals over 2,000 counties, representing over 75 percent of the nation's population. In addition, NACo is the only national organization that represents county governments in the United States. To inform our membership of locally elected officials, the organization publishes a national newspaper, the County News. County News is circulated to over 26, 000 locally elected leaders throughout the United States.

Again, we hope that the White House can provide us with these photographs. In addition, we would be more than willing to send a carrier to expedite this request. Significantly, we need these photos prior to Tuesday, February 6, 2001. Please feel free to contact me at (202) 942-4236 if you require any additional information. I thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

Dalen A. Harris

Legislative Assistant

National Association of Counties

Dalon A. Harrin

440 First Street, NW Washington, DC 20001-2080 202/393-6226 Fax 202/393-2630 www.naco.org



THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

(Cay 554859

F600603A

February 5, 2001

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

First, I offer my sincere congratulations and best wishes. From 1978 when your mother helped me win my first legislative race, the Bush family has been important to me. My children still remember you "entertaining" them at one of the fundraisers for my 1988 Railroad Commission campaign. And, of course, your father appointing me to the Interstate Commerce Commission is still the honor of my life. So, I am particularly pleased to see you become my President.

Since 1992, I have been serving as president of The National Industrial Transportation League, the nation's oldest and largest organization representing the interests of freight shippers. League members are the companies that own the freight which is moved by all transportation modes, so they are vitally interested in a healthy, competitive transportation system. Therefore, the League is a leading advocate for economic deregulation of the transportation industry, a position I have embraced since my service in the Texas House of Representatives.

The one part of the freight transportation system which is the biggest problem for shippers is the railroad industry. By their very nature, railroads do not compete with each other as well as other modes. For that reason, the Surface Transportation Board, the successor agency to the Interstate Commerce Commission, has the duty to promote competition among railroads.

The current chairman of the STB is Linda J. Morgan, a Democrat appointed by President Clinton. Prior to her appointment, she worked for Senator Hollings.

For the past several years, shippers of freight by rail have been constantly frustrated by Ms. Morgan's leadership of the agency, because she seems to always side with one particular railroad. Last year, other railroads even shared in that frustration.

The President Page Two February 5, 2001

If the Surface Transportation Board is to be viewed as even-handed and pro-competitive, it is critical that you appoint a new chairman. At this time, Wayne Burkes is the only Republican commissioner at the STB. In addition to Ms. Morgan and Mr. Burkes, the third commissioner is William Clyburn, a Democrat whose term has expired. I urge you, therefore, to designate Mr. Burkes as chairman at least until your replacement for Mr. Clyburn is confirmed.

Shippers, the customers of the transportation system, were very frustrated when the transportation advisory group for the Bush/Cheney Transition was named. It included no shippers. By naming a Republican chairman of the Surface Transportation Board, you would send a clear signal that your administration recognizes the need for a market-based freight transportation system. I would be pleased to discuss this or other transportation issues with your staff.

Again, sincere best wishes.

Sincerely,

Edward M. Emmett

President

cc: A. Card

C. Johnson

CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING SHEET

Office of the Chief of Staff to The President The White House Phone: x6-6798

DATE: 7eb. 22, 2001
DATE: Feb. 22, 2001 TO: Clay Johnson
ACTION REQUIRED
☐ Respond on behalf of the Chief of Staff
☐ Research and report back to the Chief of Staff
☐ Respond directly
☐ Take Appropriate Action
☐ For Your Information
☐ For Your Files
Prepared by: Blake

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

Clay—talk

about this.

Thanks.

fuly



Near Ed,

Mule fa The letter wel me adure we will have a more soon Best wishes Syn 30

Mr. Edward M. Emmett
President
The National Industrial
Transportation League
Suite 1900
1700 North Moore Street
Arlington, Virginia 22209-1904

CC Andy Cood wine

	FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE RESTRICTION(S)	_,)
- ; * - ; •					_
	Letter	[Job materials] - To: Andrew Card	3	03/03/2001 P2; P5; P6/b6;	

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11094

FOIA IDs and Segments:

2018-0011-P

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- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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
Records Not Subject to FOIA

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Talking Points for Governor Christine Todd Whitman Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency at the

White House Climate Change Event Washington, D.C.

February 12, 2002



- Thank you Secretary Abraham for that introduction.
- I'm pleased to be here to highlight the important efforts that are underway within the federal government and the private sector to address the serious issue of global climate change.
- Last February, President Bush announced an aggressive climate change policy designed to reduce the greenhouse gas intensity of the U.S. economy by 18% over the next ten years.
- When the President made this commitment, he knew it would take building strong partnerships to achieve our aim, and the partnerships we are announcing today are exactly what he had in mind.
- The leaders of American industry are answering the President's call to work with the federal government and take voluntary actions to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions,
- I commend you for your initiative and leadership on this issue.
- I would like to take a moment to highlight the several partnerships in which EPA plays a direct role.
- You know there are some who would have us believe that addressing greenhouse gas emissions is solely about carbon dioxide, but there are in fact six greenhouse gases of concern.
- Perfluorocarbons have 10,000 times the global warming impact of carbon dioxide, and for sulfur hexafluoride that number rises to 20,000.
- That's why it's imperative we not fall victim to tunnel vision when addressing this issue. We must act in a comprehensive manner that focuses on all the various emissions that contribute to global climate change.
- EPA has worked closely with the Semiconductor Industry Association and Aluminum

- Association over the past few years to reduce perfluorocarbon emissions, with both industries setting aggressive reduction goals.
- Our partners in the U.S. magnesium industry have agreed to completely eliminate their sulfur hexafluoride emissions by the end of 2010.
- Of course, reducing carbon dioxide emissions is still integral to our efforts on this front, and EPA is working closely with the Portland Cement Association to reduce their carbon dioxide emissions by 10 percent per ton of cement product produced from a 1990 baseline by 2020.
- All of these industry sector partnerships are helping us make bold strides towards improving our environment.
- Unfortunately, there is a perception by many that if environmental programs aren't mandated then they aren't real but I'm here to tell you that these voluntary partnerships are not only real, they are getting real results.
- You don't have to look any further than the Energy Star program to see the type of real results I'm talking about.
- In 2001 alone, Americans with the help of ENERGY STAR saved \$6 billion dollars on their energy bills, saved enough energy to power 10 million homes, and reduced greenhouse gas emissions equivalent to taking 12 million cars off the road.
- These are real results.
- Through voluntary programs such as the Landfill Methane Outreach Program and the Coalbed Methane Outreach Program, we have had success in reducing the emissions of methane, another harmful greenhouse gas.
- Methane emissions today are actually 5 percent lower than they were in 1990, and are expected to remain at this level through 2020, even as our economy continues to grow.
- Again, real results.
- We are reaching our goals and improving our environment, while at the same time allowing our economy to grow and our quality of life to endure.
- We aren't just talking about what to do about global climate change, we are moving forward quickly and aggressively and actually doing something about it.
- This Administration is fully committed to working with our nation's industries and

building successful partnerships with them as we pursue our environmental goals.

- The dedication and decision of the industries here today to play an integral role in our efforts to reduce greenhouse gases will stand as a noteworthy legacy of environmental stewardship.
- And by continuing our work together we can ensure a clean and healthy environment for our generation and future generations to come.
- Thank you.

Bennett, Melissa S.

rom:

Cooney, Phil

Sent:

Wednesday, February 12, 2003 11:53 AM

To:

Bennett, Melissa S.: Kaplan, Joel

Subject:

Final Talking points for Governor's Whitman's Speech

Melissa and Joel, below are Governor Whitman's final talkers for today's climate event at DOE. They are short (2 pages) and make excellent points. I thought that if it weren't too late, you might want to show them to Secretary Card before he drops by the reception at 4:50 today -- they will give him a good sense of what we were emphasizing at the event. Thanks, Phil

------ Forwarded by Phil Cooney/CEQ/EOP on 02/12/2003 11:49 AM -------



Seidel.Stephen@epamail.epa.gov

02/12/2003 10:31:42 AM

Record Type: Record

To:

Phil Cooney/CEQ/EOP@EOP, larisa.dobriansky@hq.doe.gov

cc:

Pemberton.John@epamail.epa.gov, Hogan.Kathleen@epamail.epa.gov

Subject: Final Talking points for Governor's Whitman's Speech

Attached are final talking points for the Governor's remarks today. They pretty much follow the earlier draft but, at her request, were shortened a bit.

(See attached file: CTWclimateremarksfinal.wpd)



CTWclimateremarks final.wpd (13...

- CTWclimateremarksfinal.wpd




THE CHIEF OF STAFT

Branstad and Associates, L.C.

February 5, 2003

Karl Rove The White House 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue Washington, D.C. 20502

Dear Karl:



As you remember well during the many visits to Iowa by then candidate, now President Bush, the President himself raised the fairness in reimbursements issue in Iowa and publicly and privately pledged to address this crisis and help find a solution.

Health Care is a key part of the President's "Signature Issues" outline of 10 areas of importance to the nation over the next several years. In Iowa, Health Care, specifically the unfair Federal Medicare reimbursement formula, is a critical issue that needs to be addressed. Iowa ranks dead last among the fifty states and anger is building over this issue.

Iowa ranks in the top ten in quality and efficiency in health care systems nationally. However, our state's ability to sust in its access and quality of service is in serious jeopardy of collapse without significant improvements in the Medicare payment policy. Iowa has the 5th highest percentage of citizens over the age of 65, and the highest percentage of population over the age of 85 in the entire country—and I need not remind you that these folks vote in the highest proportion of any age group.

Thus, because of the curren: flawed reimbursement formula, Iowa's hospitals currently subsidize the Medicare program in excess of eighty million dollars per year. The current formula is bad policy. Physicians and nurses are leaving the state, hospitals may be forced to shut down, and the quality their collective services is likely to diminish.

In a state like Iowa, where ever 50% of health care providers revenue comes from Medicare, the issue is critical. Statistically, Iowa has the lowest per-enrollee payment level in the nation – and it is a drain on lowa's economy.

As you are aware Senate Finance Chair Grassley inserted in the FY'03 omnibus spending bill short-term hospital and physician payment improvement which are acknowledgments that these payment policies co-exist and need further discussion. The Iowa delegation needs your immediate support. This is critically important to each of our congressmen and Senator Grassley. The President himself has said repeatedly that he has specific interest in seeing that a bipartisan and fair solution is developed for this important problem facing Iowa. We need your help now with the short-term improvements, as well as your assistance with Grassley, Nussle et al in their efforts to gain long term improvements in the Medicare reimbursement program.

If we can showcase the per onal involvement of the President as a key player in solving this reimburseme it crisis, it will help our delegation and the President in the 2004 elections.

The President's leadership on this and support for Senator Grassley is critically important to helping gain the consensus necessary to solve the Medicare Reimbursement crisis facing the state of Iowa. Please let us know your thoughts and let us know if we can provide any additional information.

Sincerely,

Ferry E. Branstad

CC: Andrew Card
Ken Melman
Josh Bolton
Iowa Congregational Delegation

P.S. I am enclosing an article from the Des Moines Register and a Resolution that our Republican controlled legislature is likely to pass unanimously.

Nelissa passed on a copy to Jose FYI -- Please see the medicare resolution entered into the Iowa Senate - they will take this up this week.

SCR 1

PAG LIN

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SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION NO.
     BY SEYMOUR, ANGELC, BEALL, BEHN, BLACK, BOETTGER,
      BOLKCOM, BRUNKHORST, CONNOLLY, COURTNEY, DEARDEN,
     DOTZLER, DRAKE, DVORSKY, FRAISE, GASKILL, GRONSTAL,
  5 HATCH, HOLVECK, HORN, HOSCH, HOUSER, IVERSON, JOHNSON,
    KETTERING, KIBBIE, KREIMAN, LAMBERTI, LUNDBY, McCOY, McKIBBEN, McKINLEY, M LLER, PUTNEY, QUIRMBACH, RAGAN,
      REDFERN, REHBERG, & CHUERER, SENG, SHULL, SIEVERS,
18
         STEWART, TINSMAN, VEENSTRA, WARNSTADT,
1 9
                WIECK, and Z EMAN
1 10
1 11 A Concurrent Resolution relating to the federal Medicare 1 12 program and requesting assistance from the federal
1.13
      government.
      WHEREAS, the federal Medicare program provides
1 14
1 15 health care coverage for more than 485,000 lows senior
1 16 citizens and disabled persons; and
      WHEREAS, all Americans equally contribute payroll
1 18 taxes to fund the federal Medicare program; and
      WHEREAS, lowa has a disproportionately large number
1 20 of federal Medicare enrolless, making lowa health care
1 21 providers particularly dependent on federal Medicare
1 22 payments as a revenue so irce; and
      WHEREAS, according to the Centers for Medicare and
1 24 Medicaid Services of the United States Department of
1.25 Health and Human Services, lowerhospitals provide the
1 26 eighth highest quality care of any state in the
1 27 nation; and
      WHEREAS, the current federal Medicare funding
1 29 formula has created inequi able payments, leaving lowa
1 30 with the lowest per-enrolled payment level in the
2 1 nation; and
      WHEREAS, lowa's unfairly low federal Medicare
  3 payments are a drain on lova's economy, costing the
2. 4 state of lowa approximately $1 billion annually in
2 5 Medicare reimbursement funding that could aid in the
  6 payment of health care cos s of Medicare-eligible
  7 residents: and
```

2 25 lowa's congressional delecation.

WHEREAS, Iowa's unfairly low federal Medicare -2 9 payments make it difficult to recruit physicians, 2 10 nurses, and other health care professionals, who are 2 11 in great demand throughout lower and the nation; and WHEREAS, the United States Congress has the 2 13 authority to pass legislation to address lowa's 2 14 Medicare equity concerns, NOW THEREFORE 2 15 BE IT RESOLVED BY THE SENATE, THE HOUSE OF 2 16 REPRESENTATIVES COLICURRING, That the General Assembly 2 17 of the State of lowa urges the United States Congress 2 18 to pass legislation that addresses lowa's Medicare 2 19 equity concerns; and 2 20 BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That copies of this 2 21 Resolution be sent by the Secretary of the Senate to 2 22 the President of the United States, the President of 2 23 the United States Senate, he Speaker of the United 2 24 States House of Represen atives, and to all members of

2/6/03

Medicare plan does little for us, Iowans say

MEDICARE, from Page 1A

laven't seen more on paper from hem." Grassley said.

He said the Senate plans to move mickly on Medicare, with floor iction expected as soon as June.

"When the White House finally ets things on paper and they want o give us some of their ideas, we an consider it, but the later they ire, the less apt they are to get fair consideration of their ideas," he raid.

In addition to problems with the Bush administration's plans for a prescription drug benefit, there is nothing to suggest the proposal will repair the gengraphic disparity in the Medicare system that lowans have complained about.

Thomas Scully, the top Medicare Grassley administrator, at a recent hearing told lawmakers that it will be up to Congress to repair what he described as a "broken" formula for paying doctors.

lowa has one of the lower

Medicare reimbursement rates in the nation, which health-care officials say harms the state's entire health-care system.

Scott Stanzel, a

White House

spokesman, said the

administration has

begun a dialogue

with Grasslev and

other congressional

leaders on strength-

ening Medicare, and



Bush



issue. "The president looks forward to working with Congress on our com-

mon goal." he said. Meanwhile, Iowa seniors are losing hope of getting help with staggering prescription drug prices, or seeing a boost in Medicare

payments that would keep doctors

and hospitals from losing money.

Gladys Devick, 82, of Urbandale is writing a letter to Scully complaining about the reimbursement system, which she said pays much less in Iowa than in Arizona, where she used to live.

"I can't believe we are at the bottom of the list and have been all these years." she said.

Donna Harvey, administrator of the Hawkeye Valley Area Agency on Aging in Waterloo, said seniors she deals with viewed Bush's proposal with a jaundiced eye.

"They go, Phffff," she said. "Why even bother?"

In his State of the Union address last week. Bush said health-care reform must begin with Medicare and an expanded reliance on managed care plans - of which lowa has just a handful.

Administration officials, however, have denied that the plan would require that seniors join managed care health insurance plans to obtain prescription drug

Life at the bottom

lows ranked last in Medicare payments per enrollee for the 2001 budget year, lowa's ranking improved slightly when lowans treated at hospitals outside the state such as at the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minn., were included.

	STATE	MEDICARE PAYMENTS PER ENROLLEE	STATE P	MEDICARE AYMENTS PER ENROLLEE
	1. Louisiana	\$8,099	46. New Hampshi	re #1343
	2. Florida	\$7,603	47. Vermont	
	3. New York	\$7,489	48. Alaska	
	4. Pennsylvania	\$7,226	49. New Mexico	\$3,689
1	5. Texas	\$7,104	50. lowa	\$3,414

benefits. Congressional Quarterly reported that a draft plan would deny prescription drug benefits to seniors if they remained in the current fee-for-service plan.

Grassley said the White House is welcome to sit in on meetings he plans on Medicare.

"I would even invite them to the meetings we hold once a week among members or even the meetings we hold among staff members because I think we can help educate them a lot," he said.

Between the lines

Did the White House change its travel plans because officials knew their Medicare plan wouldn't play well in lowa?

PLANS: An Associated Press report before President Bush's Jan. 28 State of the Union address quoted senior Bush advisers as saying the president planned to go to lowe as part of the lobbying effort usually mounted by presidents on the day after the State of the Union for their new proposals. White House officials refused to confirm the report.

MICHIGAN: Bush ended up going to Grand Rapids, Mich., to push Medicare reform as a priority but then devoted only a small portion of his remarks to the health-care plan for the elderty. He said only that Medicare must be more Hexible and "available to seniors in a variety of forms."

ommittee arles Grassley of Lowa, even to leading lawmaker ch as Sepate Finance

lowans say

ittle for us

plan does

See MEDICARE, Page 6A



B. iilding State Based Partnerships (202) 484-4019 FAX (202) 484-0609

Facsimile Transmission

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SCOTT PALMER

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FEBRUARY 11, 2003

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202-456-1907

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
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PAGE 01 OF 02

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SUBJECT: KARZAI CHIEF OF STAFF REQUESTS APPOINTMENTS WITH

NSA RICE AND WHITE HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF CARD

1. This is an action request. See para 2.

2. Post received the following letter on Feb 2 from President Karzai's office asking for White House appointments for Chief of Staff Sayed Tayeb Jawad during Karzai's Feb 26-27 visit to the United States. Please advise appropriate offices of Jawad's appointment requests.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

H.E. Robert Finn Ambassador of the USA Kabul, Afghanistan

The Office of the President of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America, and has the honor to inform the embassy of the United States that Sayed Tayeb Jawad, Chief of Staff of the President of the Islamic Transitional State of Afghanistan, plans to visit the United States for a period of two days between February 26 and 27 with H.E. President Hamid Karzai.

On behalf of Mr. Jawad, the Office of the President would like to request an appointment for Mr. Jawad with Condoleezza Rice, the National Security Advisor and Andy Card, Chief of Staff of the White House of the United States of America.

The Office of the President of Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of The United States the assurances of its highest UNCLASSIFIED

NSC said NO COS -JOE Hagin should handle.

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UNCLASSIFIED WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

consideration.


Thanks and Regards /s/

Khaleeq Ahmad
International Relations Officer

END TEXT

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<MSGID> M1035439



To strengthen and promote cities as centers of opportunity, leadership, and governance.



1301 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. Washington, DC 20004-1763 202-626-3000 Fax: 202-626-3043 www.nlc.nra

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> First Vice President Charles Lyons Selectman, Arlington, Massachusetts Second Vice President Anthony A. Williams Mayor, Washington, DC

Immediate Past President Karen Anderson Mayor, Minnetonka, Minnesota

Executive Director Donald J. Borut February 10, 2003

Mr. Andrew Card Chief of Staff The White House Washington, DC 20500

Dear Andy:

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F600603ANJalo30
What has ited to
well submires
Ne free for speak The National League of Cities (NLC) President John DeStefano is inviting President Bush to speak at our annual Congressional City Conference next month in Washington. While we identified Monday, March 10, at 4 p.m. as a desirable time, our members will be here on Sunday, March 9, and Monday, March 10. We would, of course, adjust our program on either of these days to accommodate the President.

We will have more than 3,000 mayors, council members, and selectmen from cities and towns of all sizes from across America. In the post 9/11 era, the partnership and interdependence among cities, states, and the federal government, particularly around Homeland Security, have become crucial. Having been an elected official in state government and served President Reagan as Director of the Office of Intergovernmental Relations, you more than most appreciate the need for effective collaboration between our cities and the federal government.

Our bipartisan membership of local elected officials from rural cities and towns, suburbs, and middle and large cities would warmly welcome President Bush as the nation must come together at this critical time. I would appreciate your consideration and assistance in providing the opportunity for President Bush to address the membership of the National League of Cities. Please feel free to call me at 202-626-3010 if you would like to discuss this invitation in more detail. Thanks for your help.

Very truly yours,

Donald J. Borut **Executive Director**

CC: Ruben Barrales

Past Presidents: Clarence E. Anthony, Mayor, South Bay, Florida • William H. Hudnurt, III, Vice Mayor, Town of Chevy Chase, Maryland • Sharpe James, Mayor, Newark, New Jersey • Bob Knight, Mayor, Wichita, Kansas • Brian J. O'Neill, Councilman, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania • Cathy Reynolds, City Council President, Denver, Colorado • Directors: Brenda S. Barger, Mayor, Watertown, South Dakota • Ronald Bates, Councilmember, Los Alamitos, California • Sally O. Beals, Mayor, Centerville, Ohio • Conrad W. Bowers, Mayor, Bridgeton, Missouri • Rozelle Boyd, Councillor, Indianapolis, Indiana • Michael S. Buehlhorn, Mayor, Swansea, Illinois • Steve Burkholder, Mayor, Lakewood, Colorado • Leo V. Chaney, Jr., Councilmember, Dallas, Texas • Roger C. Claar, Mayor, Bolingbrook, Illinois • Catherine F. Connolly, Executive Director, League of Arizona Cities and Towns • Jim Dailey, Mayor, Little Rock, Arkansas • Alex G. Fekete, Mayor, Pembroke Pines, Florida • C. Virginia Fields, Manhattan Borough President, New York, New York • Carolyn L. Floyd, Mayor, Kodiak, Alaska • Del Haag, Council Member, Buffalo, Minnesota • • Scott A. Hancock, Executive Director, Maryland Municipal League • S. Ellis Hankins, Executive Director, North Carolina League of Municipalities • George R. Harvell, Jr., Mayor, Millington, Tennessee • Charles Jennings, Commissioner, Arkansas City, Kansas • Willa Johnson, Councilwoman, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma • Helen Kawagoe, City Clark, Carson, California • Mamie E. Locke, Mayor, Hampton, Virginia • Christopher G. Lockwood, Executive Director, Maine Municipal Association • Cynthia McCollum, Council Member, Madison, Alabama - Don Moler, Executive Director, League of Kansas Municipalities - Carlton Moore, Commissioner, Fort Lauderdale, Florida - Nancy Nathanson, Councilmember, Eugene, Oregon - Kathleen M. Novak, Mayor, Northolenn, Colorado • Brenda Allison Oliver, Mayor, Sylva, North Carolina • Alex Padilla, City Council President, Los Angeles, California • George Parks, Executive Director, Wyoming Association of Municipalities • T. J. Patterson, Council Member, Lubbock, Texas • Alicia D. Ping, Mayor Pro Tem, Saline, Michigan • Marie Lopez Rogers, Vice Mayor, Avondale, Arizona • Ann Simank, Council Member, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma • Jeanie Smith, Executive Director, Mississippi Municipal League • Daniel Soza, Council Member, Saginaw, Michigan • Dan Thompson, Executive Director, League of Wisconsin Municipalities • Vera White-Reynolds, Council Member, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania • Billy D. Williams, Councilman, Florence, South Carolina

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February 15, 2003

SECTION: LOBBYING; Vol. 35, No. 7

LENGTH: 1730 words

HEADLINE: Pumping New Life Into the ACLI

BYLINE: Robert Gettlin

BODY:

2/19/03 ECHIEF OF STAFF RECHIEF SEEN When Frank Keating, a self-described "unabashed conservative Republican" and loyal supporter of George W. Bush, started his new job on January 14 as president of the American Council of Life Insurers, he got a rude surprise from the Bush administration.

The slap seems to have been unintended. After all, Keating had just finished two terms as a popular governor in Oklahoma, where he was among the first to endorse Bush's presidential bid. In 2000, Keating went on the campaign trail for Bush in 25 states.

But Keating knows from personal experience that politics and policy often get messy in Washington. He had barely settled into the executive's chair at ACLI headquarters on Louisiana Avenue at the foot of Capitol Hill before he was busy trying to explain to the administration that the president's \$695 billion plan to cut taxes and stimulate economic growth had hit the life insurance industry like a megaton bomb. Because Keating, 59, is known within the president's

inner circle-his name was on the short list of candidates to be Bush's vice president or attorney general-it's been easy to schedule meetings with White House and Treasury Department officials. Recently, Keating escorted a number of life insurance CEOs from ACLI companies to lunch with Commerce Secretary Donald L. Evans so the executives could plead their case.

The CEOs are beside themselves because the Bush plan to end the double taxation of corporate dividends would eviscerate the tax advantage for annuities, which life insurance companies sell as a popular investment vehicle for ensuring a steady stream of retirement income. There's plenty at stake: U.S. life insurers hold about 42 million individual annuity contracts with \$958 billion in reserves. And in 2001, says the ACLI, insurers received \$141 billion in annuity premium payments.

On top of that, the president's new retirement and lifetime savings plan would further devastate the annuity business. If adopted, the plan would allow an individual to invest up to \$7,500 a year in tax-exempt accounts. One advantage of an annuity is that it allows tax-deferred growth of assets,

but the tax advantage of an annuity would be unattractive compared to those of tax-free dividends and unrestricted tax-exempt withdrawals from a retirement account.

So all of Keating's managerial and persuasive abilitiesand the strengths of his ties to the Bush team-are being tested right away. Recently, Sy Sternberg, chairman and CEO of New York Life Insurance Company, reinforced just how much the ACLI's 400 member companies are counting on the former governor. "He said, 'Frank, you're our guy in Washington. We don't have anyone else,' " Keating said in an interview from an office that enjoys a postcard view of the Capitol.

Unlike banks, which rely on the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve Board to look after their interests as well as to regulate, and securities firms, which enjoy a similar relationship with the Securities and Exchange Commission, insurance companies have no federal agency. Insurance is state-regulated, which heightens the role of trade groups like the ACLI.

Keating says he and his staff have just started talking to the administration and to the new Congress about the problems in the tax plan. "We are at the table, and we intend to continue to argue our interests," he said. "There is a big difference between the tobacco lobby and the insurance lobby. We wear a white hat always. We provide an opportunity for a good tomorrow and comfort, security, and pride in one's old age. So, we don't back up to the pay window with our message. It should be heard, because it's a good message."

Whether the ACLI's message has been effectively delivered in the recent past is a subject for debate. By many accounts, the association drifted without strong leadership during the last few years under Keating's predecessor, Carroll A. Campbell Jr., the former South Carolina governor. Keating has pumped new energy into the trade group, bringing in new executives and, he said, making the association "more bipartisan."

Notably, Democrat Kimberly Olson Dorgan, the wife of Sen. Byron Dorgan, D-N.D., has been promoted to senior vice president of government relations. She takes over as the top Hill lobbyist, the job formerly held by Republican Philmore Anderson, who started his own legislative consulting firm and continues to work with the ACLI as an outside lobbyist.

"If you don't have a bipartisan apparatus, your message won't be digested," Keating said. "Yes, most life insurance CEOs are Republicans, and there will always be a flavor of Republicanism in any organization that advances our message, but we need our Democratic friends, too."

It remains to be seen whether that will translate into a new pattern of campaign giving by the ACLI political action committee. Since the 1998 election cycle, the PAC's \$1.24 million in hard-money donations has favored GOP candidates by about 3-to-1, according to the Center for Responsive Politics. And 78 percent of the PAC's \$1 million in soft-money donations since the 2000 cycle went to Republican Party committees.

Keating himself is a committed Republican and loyal to Bush.

"The president's [economic] proposal we embrace," he said. "It's not an issue of defeating the dividend tax-free proposal.... We want a level playing field for our products, not an advantage."

The industry's pitch to the administration is that the dividends inside any annuity product should receive at least the same treatment as stock and mutual fund dividends.

Persuading the president is one thing, but convincing the White House staff and administration officials is another. Keating is upbeat that the ACLI is on friendly territory, but he has had an unpleasant experience before with people who work for Bush.

Two years ago when he was among those being considered for attorney general, advisers on the Bush transition team leaked information about a 10-year-old financial gift to Keating from a friend. The gift, made over several years beginning in 1990, was meant to help Keating pay for his children's college education, and it was cleared by the ethics office at the Housing and Urban Development Department, where Keating worked at the time, as well as by the federal Office of Government Ethics. But the leak was spun in a way to derail Keating's chances for the top Justice Department job.

Columnist Paul Gigot of The Wall Street Journal wrote at the time that Keating was dumped on even after "he walked point" for Bush during the presidential campaign "with skeptical right-to-lifers," and after Keating, a former FBI agent and prosecutor, "almost single-handedly won Mr. Bush the endorsement of the Fraternal Order of Police."

Gigot reported that Keating phoned Bush Chief of Staff

Andrew H. Card Jr. and said, "I would not treat a mangy dog the way you treated me." The columnist quoted Keating on the record as saying, "I've been as loyal and committed a friend to George W. Bush as anyone. And I'm puzzled and hurt by all of these recent leaks."

Dan Mahoney, the new ACLI vice president for communications and a longtime aide to Keating, confirmed in an interview that "the Gigot column is accurate."

The Democrats have taken their shots at Keating, too. In 1992, the elder President Bush nominated Keating to be a federal appeals court judge, but Democrats on the Senate Judiciary



Committee blocked the appointment. "I was Borked," Keating said. He withdrew his name from consideration, and after Bill Clinton was elected president, Keating returned to Oklahoma and ran for governor.

He was elected in 1994 by a 17-point margin and reelected by the same margin in 1998. As a Catholic in an overwhelmingly non-Catholic state, and as a Republican battling with a Democratic-controlled Legislature, Keating had his work cut out for him. His two terms were marked by historic taxcutting measures, education reforms, the passage of a right-towork law, tort reform, and efforts to strengthen families and reduce the state's divorce rate. He also won high praise for the way he led the state after the Oklahoma City bombing of April 19, 1995.

A year ago, when it was clear that health problems would force Campbell to step aside, Keating became the overwhelming choice of the ACLI board to be the association's new leader. The governor inked a four-year deal with the association in April 2002, nine months before the end of his term. Keating's last day as governor was January 13, and he was at his desk at the ACLI the next morning.

Keating is undoubtedly making far more money now as an association CEO than he ever did as a public official. Campbell, for example, pulled down more than \$1 million in salary and benefits in 2000, according to the ACLI's filing with the IRS.

Moreover, Keating has plenty of Washington experience. After graduating from Georgetown University in the mid-1960s, earning a law degree in Oklahoma, working in federal law enforcement, and serving in the state Legislature, he came to Washington in 1985 to work for the Reagan administration. He served in a series of senior jobs at Treasury, Justice, and HUD until 1992 and his ill-fated court nomination.

Now Keating is concentrating on revitalizing the ACLI and positioning it for a seat at the head table during the tax and economic debate. To help him, he has brought in Robert Schellhas, who was chief of staff to Rep. Rob Portman, R-Ohio, to take Dorgan's old job as vice president, federal relations. Bruce Ferguson, a 17-year ACLI veteran, is the new senior vice president in charge of state relations. Mike Hunter, who was Oklahoma secretary of state and before that chief of staff to former Rep. J.C. Watts, R-Okla., is the new ACLI executive vice president and chief operating officer. On the communications side, besides Mahoney's coming aboard, longtime ACLI executive Jack Dolan has been promoted to director of media relations.

"I feel like the Colossus of Rhodes," Keating said of his new life outside politics. "Now I have a foot on both shores, the public sector and the private sector. That's the best of all possible worlds."

LOAD-DATE: February 17, 2003

prev Document 9 of 16 next ;

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Page 1 of 2

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The Union Leader (Manchester NH)

February 16, 2003 Sunday STATE EDITION

SECTION: NEWS; Pg. A3

LENGTH: 750 words

HEADLINE: (UNDER THE STATE HOUSE DOME) Labor committee expected to favor right-to-work bill

BYLINE: By TOM FAHEY

BODY:

THIS YEAR'S right-to-work bill has a good chance for a thumbs-up from the House Labor Committee -- a really good chance.

Committee Chairman Rep. Michael Gilman backs the measure, sponsored by Rep. Maureen Mooney of Merrimack, in a big way. He sponsored a similar bill. He said last week he picked a good part of his committee based on how they feel about the issue. HB 821 would make it illegal to force anyone to join or pay dues and other charges to any labor union. That would block the use of agency fees as called for in the current state workers contract, which is now being renegotiated. The bill gets a joint House-Senate hearing Wednesday at 3 p.m.

Gilman said he wanted to schedule the bill so working people would have a chance to testify on it. But he said he already knows how the vote will go.

"We've got the votes on the committee to recommend it. I know how the members feel. I picked a lot of them myself," Gilman laughed.

He attended all meetings of freshmen representatives to learn their views. First-year Rep. Jeffrey Carter of Manchester is one of his hand-picked members. "I just knew where he was on right-to-work, and that's all I needed to know," Gilman said.

Carter was angry last week because he felt pressure at his Manchester Highway Department job to vote against the bill. He said his union local president told him that if he voted for the bill, it could cost him his job.

Michael Rockwell, president of AFSCME Local 298, said they had a talk, but thinks Carter misunderstood him.

"I didn't tell him that he would lose his job. I just said there will be a lot of upset people and it'll be difficult for him to get along with other workers later. There have already been a lot of other people talking to him about it," he said. "He must have misinterpreted my point. I said, 'The guys will get upset and make it hard for you to work here. They're gonna be on your butt about it."

Gilman said he considers the incident a serious matter. He said he sent Carter to Majority Leader David Hess with the complaint. Hess told Carter to go public. "I would think retaliation would not be likely or very attractive if the threat is exposed," he said.

Get used to it. Gov. Craig Benson is not the typical governor who follows a predictable pattern.

Think you know who he'll pick as attorney general? Whoops. Nobody did, including Cheshire County Attorney Peter Heed.

Expecting big layoffs of state workers or deep social service program cuts in his budget? Think again. They aren't there.

Will there be quick action on the next major appointment, or will it drag out? It's an even bet. Benson acts on his own in his own way, one day at a time.

"You never know what I'll do. That's the beauty of me," he said last week as he dodged a question on whether he'd bring up Joseph D'Alessandro's nomination as state personnel director for a quick vote. "Thursday will bring what Thursday will bring," he said.

The day brought a surprised Heed as the attorney general nominee and a unanimous vote for D'Alessandro, even after executive councilors had voiced extreme doubt about his suitability. (See related story on Page A1.)

One of his next major nominations is the Environmental Services commissioner. God help the handicappers on that one.

Going to the Reagan-Lincoln Day Dinner on Friday at Yoken's in Portsmouth? Check your ticket. If it identifies guest speaker **Andrew Card** as the White House chief of staff, trade it in quick.

State Republican Committee Chairwoman Jayne Millerick said the Strafford and Belknap county Republicans printed the tickets without knowing the latest campaign finance laws. Now-departed state GOP Executive Director Chuck McGee warned event organizers that using Card's title on the tickets or advertising fliers could be construed as a felony.

About 500 of the tickets were printed up, so 500 new tickets were printed up with the instructions to distributors to exchange old tickets for new. The new ones just describe Card as "Honorable."

Most people willing to pay \$40 to hear him speak know the rest anyway.

Millerick, meanwhile, is seeking a replacement for McGee, who resigned right after word came out that a Republican-hired company jammed get-out-the-vote phone lines in four New Hampshire cities. She has about a dozen resumes on her desk.

"We want to make sure that our next executive director is the best candidate," she said. "We're looking forward to hiring a very qualified and hard-working person."

LOAD-DATE: February 18, 2003

prev Document 8 of 16 next >>

Nanette is aware + looking into it.

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February 16, 2003 Sunday No Of Edition OF STAFF
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SECTION: BUSINESS; Pg. 1B

LENGTH: 1110 words

HEADLINE: Top auto safety official backs off;

Runge keeps low profile after blasting SUVs, but Detroit takes NHTSA chief seriously

BYLINE: Jeff Plungis

BODY:

WASHINGTON -- If Detroit's automakers were wondering whether Dr. Jeffrey Runge was serious about safety, they now know.

The Bush administration's top auto safety official, Runge made headlines last month when he publicly blasted sport utility vehicles that were too prone to roll over, too dangerous when they struck cars and advised consumers not to equate SUVs' size and weight with safety.

Automakers, Runge warned, needed to make design changes or face new regulations from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

While it has strongly defended the safety of SUVs, the industry has taken NHTSA's chief seriously, promoting new safety features and equipment, such as stability control, and accelerating efforts to reduce the impact of SUV-car crashes. Runge's impact became clear again last week when the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers and the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, following two days of meetings, launched a joint effort to develop voluntary design changes to make cars safer in crashes with SUVs.

The industry began studying the matter after Runge made the issue a top priority last June.

"There's no question the meeting happened because Jeff laid down the challenge," said Brian O'Neill, president of the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety.

"Without the furor, this would have been a meeting of engineers that senior executives would not have been interested in. The issue has been elevated."

Amid a rising tide of bad publicity, fueled by television ads attacking SUVs as unpatriotic gas-guzzlers, Runge represents a credible, Republican official talking about the dangers of Detroit's best-selling vehicles.

While the auto industry has stepped up efforts to defend SUV safety, Runge has since been strangely silent.

"I think we'll stick to the script," he said this week when asked if he would change or expand upon any of his recent public comments.

Those who know him say Runge was taken aback by the media coverage he got after blasting SUV safety, disclosing the vehicles his family chooses to own and drive and whether he would allow his teenage children to drive an SUV.

He said he wouldn't let his child drive a poorly rated SUV "if it were the last vehicle on Earth."

The remark has drawn the most ire from the auto industry.

Since the comments, Runge has tried to shift the spotlight off himself and back onto making SUVs safer, supporters said.

Over the past few weeks, Runge has worked behind the scenes to repair his relationship with automakers. He appeared cordial and sincere in an appearance before the meeting among automakers and Insurance Institute officials last week.

But while they believe Runge's intentions on SUV safety are sincere, automakers privately seethe that they are paying the price for the doctor's political inexperience and his lack of polish as a public figure.

Nominated to head NHTSA in June 2001 and appointed three months later, Runge left a comfortable medical practice in Charlotte, N.C., to come to Washington. Some colleagues questioned the wisdom of taking a pay cut to become a lightning rod.

Every NHTSA administrator has been openly criticized by automakers who are reluctant to agree to new safety rules that add costs in a business that generates slim profits.

At the same time, consumer advocates routinely seek more federal oversight on safety concerns than NHTSA, with a relatively small staff and budget, can provide.

With a lucrative career to fall back on, Runge does not fit the mold of an ambitious political appointee aiming for the spotlight. He appears to have no interest in climbing the ladder at the Department of Transportation.

Despite the flap his Detroit speech caused, Runge has been a low-key, behind-the-scenes deal broker. Even as automakers question his take on SUV safety, General Motors Corp. and others praise Runge's work on promoting seat-belt use.

Before he became a regulator, Runge was active in highway safety issues for years. He served as speaker of the Medical Society of North Carolina and often testified before the state legislature on drunk driving and seat-belt use.

Active in the American College of Emergency Physicians, he has contributed numerous articles on impaired driving, child booster seats and the merits of motorcycle helmets.

"He's not a zealot, and he's not a fanatic," O'Neill said. "But he is very committed to reducing deaths and injuries in the United States from motor vehicle crashes.

"Like a lot of other physicians who start to work on safety issues, he recognizes that prevention is very important," O'Neill added. "They just get tired of sewing people up."

Under Runge's direction, NHTSA has continued to work behind the scenes on comprehensive safety proposals, including efforts to minimize injuries when SUVs and cars collide, and during rollovers, which disproportionately affect drivers of SUVs and other light trucks.

Last week, NHTSA staffers made recommendations, including new regulations, to Runge and other senior NHTSA officials to improve the safety of SUV-car collisions.

With Runge's blessing, NHTSA is expected to make its proposals public within the next six

weeks.

"His voice is refreshing," said Sally Greenberg, senior product counsel at Consumers' Union.

"It is a frank assessment, coming from a safety official whose job is to use the bully pulpit to promote safety. We haven't had that kind of frank opinion from a regulator at NHTSA in many years."

In the days following his January speech on SUV safety, observers in Detroit wondered whether Runge would be fired. The Bush administration's ties to the auto industry have been widely reported. **Andrew Card,** Bush's chief of staff, was GM's chief lobbyist before joining the White House.

"Regulators aren't popular people," said Joan Claybrook, NHTSA administrator during the Carter administration. "They have broad authority. Nobody is happy with what they do.

"The reason the auto industry is so angry this time is that they thought they had the key to his front door."

Advocates on both sides of the issue now think Runge is safe.

For an administration on the defensive over ties to big business, firing someone perceived as a whistleblower would be a public relations disaster.

Dr. Jeffrey Runge

Job: Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Age: 47

Background: emergency room physician

Education: University of the South, Medical University of South Carolina

Hobbies: Golf, hiking.

Priorities: Protecting occupants in SUV-car crashes; reducing rollover fatalities; increasing seat-belt usage; stemming an increase in drunk-driving related deaths.

LOAD-DATE: February 17, 2003

✓ prev Document 4 of 14 next ➤

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Fax

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To:	Andrew Card, Unier of Staff, The Fre	rom: Jeanne Lu
	White House	
fax:	(202) 456-1907 Dat	ate: February 14, 2003
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Re:	ÇC:	G
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WLA Inc.

Fax

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	White House		31 W 1 13 31 W 2 3		
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Bennett, Melissa S.

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From: Fenton, Catherine S.

Sent: Friday, February 14, 2003 2:13 PM

To: Bennett, Melissa S.; Spagnoli, Deborah A.

Cc: Garrison, Sarah M.

Subject: FW: Governors Dinner - Responses

Everyone, hot off the presses. Latest update on the Governors dinner for Sec. Card to take to Camp to review with Potus and Flotus for their tables. Thanks.

----Original Message-----

From: Turner, Tanya T.

Sent: Friday, February 14, 2003 2:02 PM

To: Fenton, Catherine S.

Subject: Governors Dinner - Responses

Cath

Here are the latest numbers:

Invites: 142
Accepts: 109
Regrets: 9
No responses: 24

Total possible: 133



030223 Governors Guest List II...



From: Fenton, Catherine S.

Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2003 6:19 PM

To: Bennett, Melissa S.

Cc: Riecke, January M.; Ball, Andrea G. Subject: Addition to Governors Dinner

Just found out that Karl Rove will not be in town for the dinner on Sunday evening. (We added him late last year.) We are at 133 and can go to 134. Melissa, can you see if Sec. Card feels it is alright to include Ruben Barrales from Karl's shop for the dinner. (Otherwise, we will include him on the after dinner entertainment list.) Thanks.

Cohat 1:05 pm

7:30 PM

THE PRESIDENT and MRS. BUSH

A A	The Honorable (Secretary) Spencer Abraham, Secretary of Energy Mrs. Spencer Abraham, Spouse of the Secretary of Energy
A A	The Honorable (Attorney General) John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States Mrs. John Ashcroft, Spouse of the Attorney General (R/Missouri)
Α	The Honorable (Governor) Juan Nekai Babauta, Governor of the Northern Mariana Islands Mrs. Diane Babauta, First Lady of the Northern Mariana Islands
A A	The Honorable (Governor) John Elias Baldacci, Governor of Maine (D) Mrs. Karen Baldacci, First Lady of Maine
A A	The Honorable (Governor) Phil Bredesen, Governor of Tennessee (D) Ms. Andrea Conte, First Lady of Tennessee (D)
A A	The Honorable (Governor) Jeb Bush, Governor of Florida (R) Mrs. Columba Bush, First Lady of Florida (R)
	The Honorable (Governor) Sila M. Calderon, Governor of Puerto Rico (PDP) Unknown Guest Calderon (Guest)
	The Honorable (Governor) Felix Camacho, Governor of Guam (R) Ms. Joann Gumataotao Garcia, First Lady of Guam (R)
A A	The Honorable (Governor) Donald Carcieri, Governor of Rhode Island (R) Mrs. Sue Carcieri, First Lady of Rhode Island (R)
A A	The Honorable (Mr.) Andrew H. Card, Jr., Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff The Reverend Kathleene B. Card, Spouse of the Assistant to the President and Chief Staff
A A	The Honorable (Secretary) Elaine Chao, Secretary of Labor The Honorable (Senator) Mitch McConnell, Spouse of the Secretary of Labor, United States Senator (R/Kentucky)
A A	The Honorable (Vice President) Richard Cheney, Vice President of the United States The Honorable (Mrs.) Lynne V. Cheney, By Messenger

A The Honorable (Governor) Gray Davis, Governor of California (D)
 A Mrs. Sharon Davis, First Lady of California (D)

A	Mrs. Dorothy Douglas, First Lady of Vermont (R)
A A	The Honorable (Governor) Jim Doyle, Governor of Wisconsin (D) Mrs. Jessica Doyle, First Lady of Wisconsin (D)
	The Honorable (Governor) Michael F. Easley, Governor of North Carolina (D) Mrs. Mary Easley, First Lady of North Carolina (D)
A A	The Honorable (Governor) Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr., Governor of Maryland (R) Mrs. Kendel Ehrlich, First Lady of Maryland (R)
A A	The Honorable (Secretary) Donald L. Evans, Secretary of Commerce Mrs. Donald L. Evans, Spouse of the Secretary of Commerce
A A	The Honorable (Governor) Mike Foster, Governor of Louisiana (R) Mrs. Alice Foster, First Lady of Louisiana (R)
A A	The Honorable (Governor) David Freudenthal, Governor of Wyoming (D) Mrs. Nancy Freudenthal, First Lady of Wyoming (D)
A A	The Honorable (Governor) Jennifer Granholm, Governor of Michigan (D) Mr. Daniel Mulhern, Spouse of the Governor of Michigan (D)
A A	The Honorable (Governor) Kenny C. Guinn, Governor of Nevada (R) Mrs. Dema Guinn, First Lady of Nevada (R)
A A	The Honorable (Governor) Brad Henry, Governor of Oklahoma (D) Mrs. Kimberley Henry, First Lady of Oklahoma (D)
A A	The Honorable (Governor) John Hoeven, Governor of North Dakota (R) Mrs. Mikey Hoeven, First Lady of North Dakota (R)
A A	The Honorable (Governor) Robert Lee Holden, Jr., Governor of Missouri (D) Mrs. Lori Hauser Holden, First Lady of Missouri (D)
A A	The Honorable (Governor) Mike Huckabee, Governor of Arkansas (R) Mrs. Janet Huckabee, First Lady of Arkansas (R)
A A	
Α	The Honorable (Governor) Dirk Kempthorne, Governor of Idaho (R) and Vice Chairman,

National Governors Association

Mrs. Dirk Kempthorne, First Lady of Idaho and Associate Senate Spouse (R) A The Honorable (Governor) Theodore R. Kulongoski, Governor of Oregon (D) Ms. Mary Oberst, First Lady of Oregon (D) The Honorable (Governor) Michael O. Leavitt, Governor of Utah (R) Mrs. Jacalyn Leavitt, First Lady of Utah (R) The Honorable (Governor) Linda Lingle, Governor of Hawaii (R) Dr. Randy Roth, Senior Adviser, Policy, Office of the Governor of Hawaii (R) (Guest) A The Honorable (Governor) Gary Locke, Governor of Washington (D) À Mrs. Mona Locke, First Lady of Washington (D) Mr. Lyle Lovett, Singer and Song Writer Ms. April Kimble, Guest of Mr. Lyle Lovett (Guest) The Honorable (Secretary) Mel Martinez, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Mrs. Mel Martinez, Spouse of the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, A (guest of Lady Meyer) The Honorable (Governor) Judy Martz, Governor of Montana (R) The Honorable (Governor) James E. McGreevey, Governor of New Jersey (D) Mrs. Dina Matos McGreevey, First Lady of New Jersey (D) The Honorable (Governor) Ruth Ann Minner, Governor of Delaware (D) Mr. Mark Brainard, Chief of Staff, Office of the Governor of Delaware (Guest) Α The Honorable (Governor) Frank Murkowski, Governor of Alaska (R) Mrs. Nancy Murkowski, First Lady of Alaska (R) A The Honorable (Governor) Ronnie Musgrove, Governor of Mississippi (D) Unknown Guest Musgrove (Guest) A The Honorable (Governor) Janet Napolitano, Governor of Arizona (D) Mr. Mario Diaz, Deputy Chief of Staff, Urban Affairs, (Guest of the Governor of Arizona) (Guest) The Honorable (Secretary) Gale Norton, Secretary of the Interior Mr. John G. Hughes, Spouse of the Secretary of the Interior The Honorable () Frank L. O'Bannon, Governor of Indiana (D)

Mrs. Judy O'Bannon, First Lady of Indiana (D)

- A The Honorable (Governor) Bill Owens, Governor of Colorado (R) and Chairman, Republican Governors Association
 A Mrs. Frances Owens, First Lady of Colorado (R)
 A The Honorable (Secretary) Roderick Paige, Secretary of Education Unknown Guest Paige (Guest)
 A The Honorable (Governor) George E. Pataki, Governor of New York (R)
 A Mrs. Libby Pataki, First Lady of New York (R)
- A The Honorable (Governor) Paul E. Patton, Governor of Kentucky (D) and Chairman, National Governors Association
- A Mrs. Judi Patton, First Lady of Kentucky (D)
- A The Honorable (Governor) Tim Pawlenty, Governor of Minnesota (R)
- A Mrs. Mary Pawlenty, First Lady of Minnesota (R)
- A The Honorable (Governor) Sonny Perdue, Governor of Georgia (R)
- A The Honorable (Governor) Edward Rendell, Governor of Pennsylvania (D)
- A Mrs. Marjorie Rendell, First Lady of Pennsylvania (D)
- A The Honorable (Governor) Bill Richardson, Governor of New Mexico (D)
- A Mrs. Barbara Richardson, First Lady of New Mexico (D)
 - The Honorable (Secretary) Thomas J. Ridge, Secretary of Homeland Security Mrs. Thomas J. Ridge, Spouse of the Secretary of Homeland Security
- A The Honorable (Governor) Bob Riley, Governor of Alabama (R)
- A Mrs. Patsy Riley, First Lady of Alabama (R)
 - The Honorable (Governor) Mitt Romney, Governor of Massachusetts (R)
 Mrs. Ann Romney, First Lady of Massachusetts (R)
- A The Honorable (Governor) Mike Rounds, Governor of South Dakota (R)
- A Mrs. Jean Rounds, First Lady of South Dakota (R)
- A The Honorable (Governor) John G. Rowland, Governor of Connecticut (R)
- A Mrs. Patty Rowland, First Lady of Connecticut (R)
- A The Honorable (Governor) Mark Sanford, Governor of South Carolina (R)
- A Mrs. Jenny Sanford, First Lady of South Carolina (R)

- A The Honorable (Governor) Kathleen Sebelius, Governor of Kansas (D)
- A Mr. Gary Sebelius, Spouse of the Governor of Kansas (D)
 - The Honorable (Secretary) John Snow, Secretary of the Treasury
 Mrs. Carolyn Snow, Spouse of the Secretary-designate of the Treasury
 - The Honorable (Governor) Tauese P.F. Sunia, Governor of American Samoa (D)

 Mrs. Fagaoalii Sunia, First Lady of American Samoa (D)
- A The Honorable (Governor) Bob Taft, Governor of Ohio (R)
- A Mrs. Hope Taft, First Lady of Ohio (R)
- A The Honorable (Secretary) Tommy G. Thompson, Secretary of Health and Human Services Mrs. Tommy G. Thompson, Spouse of the Secretary of Health and Human Services
- A The Honorable (Governor) Charles W. Turnbull, Governor of the United States Virgin Islands (D)
- A Mrs. Mavis M. Richards, Sister of Governor Turnbull (Virgin Island/D) (Sister)
- A The Honorable (Secretary) Ann M. Veneman, Secretary of Agriculture
- A The Honorable (Governor) Thomas J. Vilsack, Governor of Iowa (D)
- A Mrs. Christie Vilsack, First Lady of Iowa (D)
- A The Honorable (Governor) Mark Warner, Governor of Virginia (D)
- A Ms. Lisa Collis, First Lady of Virginia (D)
- A The Honorable (Administrator) Christine Todd Whitman, Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
- A Mr. John R. Whitman, Spouse of the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
 - The Honorable (Governor) Bob Wise, Governor of West Virginia (D)

 Mrs. Sandy Wise, First Lady of West Virginia (D)

Regrets

R	The Honorable (Governor) Craig Benson, Governor of New Hampshire (R)
R	Mrs. Denise Benson, First Lady of New Hampshire (R)
R R	The Honorable (Governor) Rod R. Blagojevich, Governor of Illinois (D) Mrs. Patricia Blagojevich, First Lady of Illinois
R	Mr. Harry Martz, Spouse of the Governor of Montana (R) (Husband of The Honorable (Governor) Judy Martz)
R	Mrs. Mary Perdue, First Lady of Georgia (R) (Wife of The Honorable (Governor) Sonny Perdue)
	The Honorable (Governor) Rick Perry, Governor of Texas (R) Mrs. Anita Perry, First Lady of Texas (R)
R	Unknown Guest Veneman (Guest of The Honorable (Secretary) Ann M. Veneman)

7:30 PM

INVITATION STATISTICS:

INVITES

142

ACCEPTS

109

REGRETS

9

NO RESPONSES

24

ATTENDS

0

TOTAL POSSIBLE

133

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FRC ID:

10922

OA Num.:

11094

NARA Num.:

11094

FOIA IDs and Segments:

2018-0011-P

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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Records Not Subject to FOIA

Court Sealed - The document is withheld under a court seal and is not subject to the Freedom of Information Act.

Bennett, Melissa S.

From: Eskew, Tucker A.

Sent: Friday, February 14, 2003 2:58 PM

To: Bennett, Melissa S.

Subject: for Andy...This exchange occurred on the Hill yesterday

CONGRESSWOMAN TAMMY BALDWIN: ...My second question relates to what I fear is a subtle erosion of the Department's ability to perform some of its core functions. I think the President's budget proposal and recent actions seem to shift some power from State to the White House. Specifically, I'm thinking about the President's recently signed Executive Order formalizing the role of the White House Office of Global Communications in the nation's public diplomacy overseas. ...

SECRETARY COLIN POWELL: ... With respect to -- I'm sorry, ma'am, let me just talk quickly on your other two points. On both the White House Office of Global Communications and the Millennium Challenge Account, I don't feel threatened. We need a Global Communications Office in the White House, because if it's just the State Department doing its thing and saying, "This is all mine and I will do it through my international programs," then we aren't always that well coordinated with what the Pentagon might doing and vice-versa.

Communications has become such a complex business in this 24/7 world, where you've got to be up to the day, you've got to get the information out, that there was a need for an overall communications effort. And to show you how it works, the Office of Global Communications is putting out now a daily sheet of messages and what we should be saying as a government. And I just instructed my staff this past Monday morning at a staff meeting -- I think it was Monday, it might have been Tuesday -- "Make sure that sheet gets out electronically to every embassy in the world. I want every ambassador to see this so they know what the whole government is thinking, not just what the State Department is thinking." So I don't feel challenged by that and we're working closely with the new office.

Schedule of the Chief of Staff

Saturday, February 15, 2003

8:00 am

Intelligence Briefing

(30 min)

(Rice)

Camp David

Camp David

11:00 am (1 hr)

SVTS Meeting with Rice, Meyers, Pace,

Libby and Greenwood

RON: Camp David

Sunday, February 16, 2003

1:00 pm

LB Depa

Depart Camp David en route

(30 min)

The White House

American History

1:30 pm

LB:

Arrive The White House

Monday, February 17, 2003 - President's Day

6:00 am	Depart Residence en route The White House	
7:45 am (5 min)	NSC Pre-Brief (Rice)	Oval Office
7:50 am (10 min)	Phone Call to the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia (goldline only) (Rice)	Oval Office
8:00 am (30 min)	Intelligence Briefing (Rice)	Situation Room
8:30 am (20 min)	FBI Briefing (Abbot)	Situation Room
8:50 am (5 min)	Depart The White House en route	
	Smithsonian National Museum of	

8:55 am	Arrive Smithsonian National Museum of American History	
9:00 am (15 min)	Tour "The American Presidency" Exhibit (Bridgeland)	Washington, DC – PRESS POOL
9:20 am (30 min)	Remarks at the "We the People" Forum on American History, Civics, and Service (Bridgeland)	Washington, DC – OPEN PRESS
9:55 am (5 min)	Depart Smithsonian National Museum of American History en route The White House	
10:00 am	Arrive The White House	
10:05 am (40 min)	Personal/Staff Time	Oval Office
10:45 am (10 min)	NSC Pre-Brief (Rice)	Oval Office
11:00 am (20 min)	Meeting with the President of Latvia (Rice)	Oval Office – STILLS AT TOP
11:20 am (7 hr 40 min)	Personal/Staff Time	Oval Office
11:30 am (1 hr)	WHIG	Situation Room
7:00 pm LB (25 min)	Cocktails (goldline only)	Residence
	(b)(6)	

PRESS OFFICE MEMORANDUM

FROM:

Adam Levine

RE:

Sunday Show Proposal – 2/16/03

DATE:

February 14, 2003

NBC "Meet the Press"

Dr. Rice

CBS "Face the Nation"

Secretary Ridge

ABC "This Week"

Secretary Ridge

FOX "News Sunday"

Dr. Rice

CNN "Late Edition"

Secretary Ridge

SIGN OFF

PRESS SECRETARY

No_

COMMUNICATIONS DIRECTOR

No___

CHIEF OF STAFF

No

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF



(202) 456-6798 – Phone (202) 456-1907 – Fax

February 14, 2003

TO: Sec. Card

FAX NUMBER: Camp David

FROM: Melissa Bennett

TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES: 13 pages including cover

Message:

- 1. Cathy Fenton would like you to talk to The President and Mrs. Bush about NGA dinner seating for their tables. IGA has included their suggestions.
- 2. Email from Tucker Eskew
- 3. Colleen needs to talk to you ASAP about 2 Missions for next week. One of them is for Sec. Powell and there are some plane challenges.
- 4. (b)(6)
- 5. Karl would like to talk to you about NGA. Please call him when you have time.
- 6. Schedule for 2/15, 2/16, and 2/17

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1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20500

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE RESTRICTION(S)
		<u> </u>	
Email	POTUS table 2/23 - To: Andrew H. Card - From: Ruben S. Barrales	1 02	2/18/2003 P5;

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COLLECTION:

Records Management, White House Office of

SERIES:

Subject Files - FG006-03A (Chief of Staff, Office Files)

FOLDER TITLE:

554859

FRC ID:

10922

OA Num.:

11094

NARA Num.:

11094

FOIA IDs and Segments:

2018-0011-P

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NGO - INSTITUTE OF INTER-BALKAN RELATIONS

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

FACSIMILE

To:

The White House, Washington, D.C.

Attn.:

The Honorable George W. Bush, President of the United States

of America

Fax:

202-456-1907

Date:

February 19, 2003

of pages:

3 (including this page)

Dear Mr. President:

We listen to the media all day long. We get e-mails from all over the world, e.g., "Iraq – Inspection or Invasion?"

Knowing well Iraq and Saddam Hussein, our answer is invasion now!

Mr. President, do not give Saddam more time to destroy us and the rest of the world.

Mr. President, you have our support and 95% of the Iraqi population is with you.

God bless you Mr. President. God bless Americal

With great respect,

Harry Doumas, AHEPA, SAE, AHI, UN Institute of Inter-Balkan Relations

Harry Doumas



Mr. Harry Doumas attended Huddersfield University in England where he studied Economics and Industrial Organization. He also attended Stanford University in California, USA. There he studied graduate level Commerce and Trade. Mr. Doumas is the Honorary President of Piraeus Chamber of Commerce, Former President of the Hellenic Chambers of Commerce Committee in the European Community, Honorary President of the Alexandria Egypt Chamber of Commerce, Former President of Hatziconsta Foundation, Former Member of the Board of the Hellenic Shipowners Association, Piraeus, Hellas, Member of the New York Maritime Association, Member of the Hellenic American Chamber of Commerce. He is also involved with the AHEPA, SAE, United Nations-NGO/ECO, The American-European Community Association and The American-Hellenic Institute. He is President of Dumarc Shipping Company S.A. and the American-Hellenic Investment and Management Company.

UNITED NATIONS



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HARRY DOUMAS NGO - INSTITUTE OF INTER-BALKAN RELATIONS

(b)(6)

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18/02/03

This week in the spotlight on tiesweb.org!

- I, "IRAQ-Imperious or Invasion?" / fast week of union discussion moderated by Polligik,
- 2. Transatiantic Visions: Tim Erikson and Wolfgang Böckeri

J. El' UN articles

1. "IRAQ-Inspections or Invasion?" / second week of discussion moderated by Politalk.

IRAO - Inspections or Invasion?

Jan 29 - Feb 21, 2003

To Join: TP-Iraq-Subscribe@Yahoogroups.com // More Info: http://www.politalk.com/topics/Iraq/

Excerpts from posts to our current online discussion:

"The U.S.A must provide convincing proof that Saddam has moster materials, hiding numerals or impeding the work of the inspectors, if any of these is proven, then, Iraq must be attacked. And any such uttack must focus on the removal of that dictator from office. Saddam law shown beyond doubt that he has expansionary plans and in pursuit of that he is propored to use anything, do unything. But the evidence must be provided first and we shallall than back the USA to use force to disarm this stangerous dictatur. Thomas Membell Autor Access, Thomas West

- "I feel that the world has had issued like this believe, and that from a lack of strong leadership, evil things have killed millions... The strong take action, while the well meaning indecisive leading by committee all back and watch people die, and the dvil lunstles grow stronger." Drame Quam It. Byron, Milkersote USA
- "I feel it is imperative that a scored UN resolution is achieved if the UN is to inunitaln credibility at the international government of nations, American unlistendium will asverely weaken its percented power. Furthernore, we must writte that a succession plan in in place when Sadden is deposed. Firstly Iraq minst not be allowed to become destabilised and secondly international interests must not be allowed to arhitrarily divide up its oil fields amongst them: " Sieve Smith Jersey - UK
- "Continued inspections might be an effective way to "contain" the problem—and for more chouply than investor, " Jack Seymour Artington, Virginia - USA
- "Even if the possible was is quickly now, Hussein game, and there is relative mability in the region at first l'in fouring the averall consequences of such war. I totally druist, that torrarius will be stopped of at least constained through such action. I fear the contrary is the case. Hertilly against the UR and the West will increase and in the worst case torours will become as common us it is now, infortunately, in Israel." Street Haffer Wachington, DC - ISIA
- "I would mally like to see Seckiam exited, but if that disen't happen, I think the best we can hope for is a short wor, it's the aftermeth that I'm more concerned about... I think it's poing to be very countex and very datigerous. Purhaps we will have a belief outcome that we had a live a livery provide, despite the possibiles of last on that y fast. "Lynn Gitelis Golden Volley, Misseach: USA
- "I do not like Sadding, bud I do not believe pres. Bush. The belief way, how establish ilumoracy, is spend money not for weapons and war but for development of poor countries. This world is unjust and that is the main problem. The Bush administration is note dangerous for world.

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900 Seventeenth St. N.W. + Suite 502 + Washington, D.C. 20006 + 202-296-9365- + Fax 202-296-9395 + Website: ffip.com

554859

February 19, 2003

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Brent Scowcroft

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The attached op-ed, "Korea Can't Wait' was written by Brent Scowcroft and Daniel Poneman. The op-ed appeared in the February 16th edition of *The Washington Post*. We hope you find it informative.

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OUTLOOK

SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 2003

Brent Scowcroft and Daniel Poneman

Korea Can't Wait

Within weeks, North Korea may start reprocessing 8,000 spent fuel rods containing enough plutonium for five to six nuclear weapons. Today we have no good options to confront that threat. But if we do not act now, our options will only get worse.

North Korea may already possess one or two nuclear weapons, but U.S. policy correctly calls for the Korean Peninsula to be free of all nuclear weapons. In a matter of months; the six to eight bombs' worth of plutonium Pyongyang could then possess would be enough to support an offensive military strategy—and to export. North Korea has announced the restart of its existing nuclear reactor, and it could finish construction of two larger reactors that were frozen under the 1994 Agreed Framework. Within a few years it could be

churning out dozens of bombs' worth of plutonium each year. By then, its secret enrichment program could be producing bomb-grade uranium, too.

Under those circumstances, intense pressure would build in South Korea and Japan to acquire nuclear weapons. The reverberations would quickly extend to Taiwan and China, then India and Pakistan.

If North Korea continues to view unconventional weapon exports as its chief cash crop, it will find numerous customers with adequate means and motive. Access to plutonium could shave years off the efforts of al Qaeda and other terrorists to obtain the weapon of ultimate destruction.

We cannot afford to defer this issue. Time is on North Korea's side; each day increases North Korea's nuclear and nlassile capabilities, enhancing its military strength and hargaining leverage—while narrowing our options to respond. The North Korean regime will ultimately follow other dictatorships into oblivion, but this will not happen soon enough to spare us the terrible consequences of its acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, indeed, if North Korea builds up its nuclear arsenal while it sees the United States diverted by Iraq, it may enhance its ability to survive that much longer and inflict that much more harm.

What to do? First we should make clear to North Korea that separating plutonium from the spent fuel rods at Yongbyon represents an unacceptable threat to U.S. and allied security. We should work with our allies in Seoul and Tokyo to make clear that separation of that plutonium from the spent fuel would constitute a "red line" that Pyongyang would cross only at its peril. While attacking the Yongbyon facility is an option of last resort, the best way to ensure that we do not need to consider it is to deter Pyongyang now by demonstrating strategic clarity on this point.

Second, we should propose to North Korea that, in exchange for freezing all nuclear activities, we would be prepared to discuss the full range of security issues affecting the peninsula. While the president is right not to yield to blackmall, under this approach there is no need to "pay" Pyongyang to adhere to past commitments. Instead the United States should propose to go beyond the 1994 Agreed Framework to a



BY TIM BRINTO

comprehensive approach that, for example, expands the inspection rights of the International Atomic Energy Agency throughout North Korea and immediately secures the removal of the 8,000 spent fuel rods from the peninsula.

In exchange for such an expanded set of obligations, the United States should be willing to provide the kind of security assurances North Korea seeks, as well as other steps to bring North Korea into the community of nations. As the president has said, our quarrel is not with the North Korean people, so steps to improve their lot through increased trade and communications could be considered favorably.

The United States should be willing to enter into these discussions in any forum, multilateral or bilateral. The urgency of the crisis brooks no delay over matters of form. Moreover, direct talks represent no substantive concession to Pyongyang; allowing plutonium reprocessing would.

While the North Korean challenge clearly is multilateral in nature, pressing Beijing, Seoul, Tokyo and Moscow to act is no surrogate for U.S. leadership. First, these governments may join a U.S.-led consensus, but they are unlikely to support a U.S. vision of concerted action if Washington stands in the wings. Second, in order to persuade refuctant governments to apply meaningful pressure on Pyongyang, the United States needs to show a serious effort to resolve the situation through diplomacy.

If the United States offers a clear vision of the diplomatic solution it favors—and a road map to get there—it can mobilize an international consensus on the North Korean challenge. Only a united international community can muster enough pressure to induce North Korea to reverse course. Otherwise, we will soon face a rampant plutonium production program that could spark a nuclear arms race in Asia and provide deadly exports to America's most implacable enemies.

Brent Scowcroft was national security adviser under Presidents Gerald R. Ford and George H.W. Bush. He is founder and president of the Forum for International Policy. Daniel Poneman was on the National Security Council staff under Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton.

87

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	FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE		PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
٠.			•			
	Email	British public opinion - To: Daniel J. Bartlett, et al From: Tucker	A.	1	02/19/2003	P5;
		Eskew				

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Records Management, White House Office of

SERIES:

Subject Files - FG006-03A (Chief of Staff, Office Files)

FOLDER TITLE:

554859

FRC ID:

10922

OA Num.:

11001

11094

NARA Num.:

11094

FOIA IDs and Segments:

2018-0011-P

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Email	Lending - To: Andrew H. Card - From: Joshua B. Bolten 1	02/18/2003	P5;

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Noach Dear
(b)(6)

President George Bush White House 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue Washington D.C.

Dear Mr. President.

May I express the gratitude of hundreds of millions around the globe for your courageous stand against Saddam Hussein. In particular, your courage and firmness in resisting the blaring voices of expediency and cowardice of our wayward allies is heartening proof that popularity and principle must sometimes part ways.

I take the liberty of urging you to read Jeremiah chapter 51, which is the prophecy concerning Babylonia, the Iraq of old.

Enclosed is the commentary on that chapter of the late Rabbi Joseph Breuer. As a refugee from Hitler's Germany, Rabbi Breuer understood the danger to the world of cruel tyranny and megalomaniacal tyrants. He came to the United States, the adopted country he loved, and built a vibrant religious community in Upper Manhattan. Incidentally, among his congregants were the parents of Henry Kissinger.

Sincerely,

More Doen

May Good Dear

Noach Dear

Auroug this difficult time.